

Joint Publication 1



Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States



14 November 2000



Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, serves as the capstone publication for all US joint doctrine. This revision represents the evolution in our warfighting guidance since the last edition — including sections on consideration for the use of force, interagency operations, and multinational operations. This publication also includes an expanded scope that bridges the gap among the national, strategic, and operational levels.

JP 1 now ties joint doctrine to the national security strategy and national military strategy and describes the military's role in the development of national policy and strategy. It provides the linkage between joint doctrine and the contribution of other government agencies and multinational endeavors. JP 1 sets forth the concepts, relationships, and processes necessary for unified action of joint, interagency, and multinational operations. This publication also addresses the importance of doctrine in the development of future concepts and capabilities, since joint doctrine provides the foundation for addressing the future.

Most of all, JP 1 is about the employment of the Armed Forces as an instrument of national power, with the enduring theme — **joint warfare is team warfare**. The philosophy is reflected throughout this publication, from the mindset and attitudes described in joint values through the guidance on fundamentals of joint operations. It is the attitude of the team approach, established on the foundation of joint doctrine that is universally understood and practiced, that ensures the most effective employment of our Armed Forces.

The knowledge and use of joint doctrine positions us for success in fighting the Nation's wars — where winning is the only choice. To that end, commanders must understand, teach, and apply joint doctrine as they prepare and train the Nation's Service men and women for joint force employment.

Please ensure the widest distribution of this and the other supporting joint publications, promoting their use at every opportunity.



HENRY H. SHELTON
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

1. Scope

Joint Publication 1 is the capstone joint doctrine publication. It guides the Armed Forces of the United States in joint, multinational, and interagency activities at all levels across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

The Armed Forces fulfill unique and crucial roles, defending the United States against all adversaries and serving the Republic as a bulwark and the guarantors of its independence. When called to action, they support and defend national interests worldwide. The Armed Forces embody the highest values and standards of American society and the profession of arms. They fulfill their roles, missions, and functions within the American system of civil-military relations. They serve under the civilian control of the President who is the Commander in Chief.

The nature of the challenges to the United States and its interests in the contemporary security environment demand that the Armed Forces operate as a fully integrated joint team in combat and noncombat operations. These operations often take place with forces of allies and coalition partners, and with US and foreign governmental and nongovernmental nonmilitary agencies. The challenges are best met when the unified action of the Armed Forces elicits the maximum effect from the unique but complementary capabilities of each Service and command, and from the synergy that results from their synchronized and integrated action.

Joint warfare is team warfare. Effectively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or seams to an adversary, while they rapidly and efficiently find and engage those adversary weak points and

vulnerabilities that assure mission accomplishment. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders may choose the capabilities they need from the air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces at their disposal.

3. Application

This publication is written to assist members of the Armed Forces of the United States to operate successfully together. The joint team is comprised of the members of each Service, active and reserve, as well as associated civilians in the supporting governmental and private sector workforces. The guidance in this publication is broad and authoritative. It requires a leader's judgment in application. This doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.

The Services have the principal responsibility to organize, train, equip, and sustain forces. These forces are employed under joint force commanders. Therefore, to assure that the Armed Forces achieve their fullest potential, all American military leaders must integrate the content of this publication into their efforts to develop leaders and train forces for joint, multinational, and interagency operations.

Service skills form the very core of US military capability. Joint warfare relies upon Service traditions, cohesion, and expertise. Successful joint operations are made possible by the capabilities developed and embodied in each Service, including Service "cultures," heroes, and professional standards. The Armed Forces of the United States continue to build on the tradition of joint victory in war that began with the Revolutionary War.

The Armed Forces of the United States face unparalleled challenges to US interests around the world, unlike nations whose military forces can concentrate on a more limited range of operational environments. This means that joint forces must master multifaceted conditions in conducting successful unified action. The chapters that follow describe the principles for forming, training, and employing joint teams in unified action at all levels across the range of military operations. These broad principles that guide operations are neither policy nor strategy — they are

doctrine. The principles apply to action undertaken by the Armed Forces of the United States to execute applicable national policies, as well as the contemporary national security and military strategies.

Today, joint action is practiced and routine. The key to maintaining and enhancing joint force effectiveness is the military leader's diligence in studying, applying, teaching, and ultimately improving joint doctrine, which provides the foundation for joint warfare.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Guides the Joint Action of the Armed Forces of the United States**
 - **Describes the Strategic Security Environment**
 - **Explores the Purpose of American Military Power and Its Core Competencies**
 - **Provides Considerations for the Application of Military Force Guided by National Military Strategy**
 - **Specifies Fundamentals for Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations**
 - **Addresses the Challenges of the Future**
-

Fundamental Concepts

The fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces is to win the Nation's wars.

The Armed Forces of the United States hold in trust for the American people the military power of the Nation and are the ultimate guarantors of its territorial integrity and independence. Challenges and threats may arise from adversaries who are opposed to US values and interests. **The fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces is to win the Nation's wars.** The employment of American military power adheres to constitutional and other legal imperatives, the highest societal values, and the concepts of proportionality, decisiveness, and accountability to the American people. Military commanders at all levels are responsible for infusing in the fighting forces an attitude of willing joint integration of effort that recognizes that all forms of combat power present advantages for exploitation.

National security depends on the complementary application of the instruments of national power.

The United States relies for its security on the complementary application of the basic instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. Guided by national security policy and strategy, the Armed Forces of the United States shape and employ the military instrument to advance and defend national security interests and objectives.

Senior US military leaders provide the advice and recommendations on the application of the military instrument and its integration with the other instruments.

Senior US military leaders are responsible for providing advice and recommendations to the President and the Congress on military aspects of national security including the development of forces, implications of the use of force, and integration of military planning and actions with the other instruments of national power. Combatant commanders also have the unique responsibility for execution of military actions under the National Command Authorities — the President and the Secretary of Defense, or their duly deputized alternates or successors — in furtherance of national security policy and strategy.

Effective deterrence depends on visible, credible, military capability that can be demonstrated. Its use in conflict must be decisive and overwhelming.

American military power has vital roles in peace, crisis, and conflict. In peace, the political imperative is to maintain visible, credible military capability and readiness for response across the range of military operations. **Demonstrated military capability is the cornerstone of deterrence**, which remains a principal means for dissuading would-be aggressors and adversaries from action harmful to the United States. During crisis, US military authorities focus on activities that bolster deterrence in conjunction with the other instruments of national power and prepare for rapid and effective transitions to conflict should deterrence fail. During conflict, the principal responsibility of the Armed Forces of the United States is to employ rapid and decisive military power to achieve US objectives, and do so in a manner that sustains the fruits of success in the postconflict environment. In unilateral or multinational operations, the United States adheres to domestic and international law governing warfare. It also conforms to domestic and international legal conventions and prescriptions supporting human rights.

Military doctrine shapes the way the Armed Forces think about the use of the military instrument of national power.

Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Joint doctrine provides authoritative guidance, based upon extant capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States. It incorporates time-tested principles for successful military action as well as contemporary lessons which together guide aggressive exploitation of US advantages against adversary vulnerabilities. Doctrine shapes the way the Armed Forces think about the use of the military instrument of national power.

The Strategic Security Environment

The international security environment is dynamic and uncertain. Military estimates must include threats abroad and their projection to US territory.

The international security environment is dynamic and uncertain, with recurring disputes, crises, and conflicts in many regions, and endemic conflicts in regions of particular importance to the security of the United States. Challengers and adversaries may be states or groups of states, as well as nonstate groups including terrorist, criminal, ethnic, religious, and special-interest organizations. Military assessments and estimates must include threats abroad as well as the projections of those threats to US territory. The United States itself is not a sanctuary from many of the forces threatening US security; it is not immune from attack.

Senior military leaders provide recommendations on feasible military options, resources required, and anticipated consequences of military action, as well as the military requirements for conflict termination.

Military leaders have fundamental responsibilities in developing national assessments of the strategic situation. Specifically, in the US system of civil-military relations, senior military leaders provide recommendations on the feasible military options, resources required and anticipated consequences of military action, and the military requirements for conflict termination. They also are uniquely responsible for the military components of operation plans developed in response to decisions prompted by national assessments of the strategic situation.

American Military Power

The Armed Forces are measured by success in combat and unconditional service in military operations other than war.

Success in combat in defense of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, societal values, and national interests is the essential goal and measure of the value of the profession of arms in American society. The Armed Forces also have a long history of unconditional service in military operations other than war that support broad national objectives including such areas as participating in humanitarian relief efforts for victims of natural disasters in the United States and abroad.

The Armed Forces of the United States must have extant capabilities and maintain core military competencies for successful action across the range of military operations.

The Armed Forces of the United States must have extant capabilities and maintain core military competencies for successful action across the range of potential military operations, including the ability to deploy rapidly from the United States or other locations to the region of need. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commanders have unique responsibilities for planning and directing the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. This is their core competency. The Military Services, the United

States Special Operations Command, and Defense agencies that develop and provide force elements to combatant commands for employment have as primary responsibilities organizing, training, and equipping forces for joint employment by combatant commanders in accordance with joint doctrine.

In the human undertaking of war, military values provide the bedrock of combat success. They are Integrity,

Competence,

Physical and moral courage,

and Teamwork.

Joint warfare is team warfare, requiring integration and synchronization of capabilities.

The principles of war are: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity.

War is a human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules. Of primary importance, therefore, are the values that US military experience has proven to be the bedrock of combat success. The foremost value is **integrity**, the cornerstone for building trust. Military men and women must know that they can count on each other to say what they mean and do what they say, relying with confidence on others to carry out assigned tasks. **Competence** is at the core of the profession of arms and includes both the technical competence to perform the relevant task to standard as well as the ability to integrate that skill with others according to joint doctrine. **Physical and moral courage** have defined warriors throughout history. Even in warfare characterized by advanced technology, individual fighting spirit and courage remain the inspiration for teamwork. Moral courage involves competent risk taking and tenacity and includes the willingness to stand up for what one believes to be right, accepting full responsibility for the outcome. Finally, **teamwork** results from cooperative efforts based on demonstrated competence and a willing attitude to achieve common goals.

Joint warfare is team warfare. This requires the integrated and synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities. The synergy that results maximizes combat capability in unified action. Joint doctrine stipulates joint operations guided by the principles of war, the adaptation of these principles to military operations other than war, and the fundamentals of joint warfare that result from applying the basic principles to actual experience of American arms in warfare.

The principles of war adopted by the Armed Forces of the United States are **objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity.**

The principles of military operations other than war are: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.

Adapting these, the principles for military operations other than war are **objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy**. The fundamentals that guide joint operations are anchored on these principles. They do not supersede the principles of war. They must be considered together when conducting joint operations.

Applying the principles of war to American experience in joint warfare derives the fundamentals of joint warfare: unity of effort, concentration, initiative, agility, extension, freedom of action, sustainment, clarity, knowledge of self, and knowledge of the enemy.

The fundamentals of joint warfare are **unity of effort, concentration, initiative, agility, extension, freedom of action, sustainment, clarity, knowledge of self, and knowledge of the enemy**. These principles and fundamentals should be applied broadly in peace, crisis, or conflict, avoiding literal or dogmatic interpretations, across the range of military operations (**war and military operations other than war**). Military operations typically represent only one dimension of US action and require integration with the other instruments of national power.

The Armed Forces must be prepared to conduct a complex set of military operations simultaneously across and within theaters.

The Armed Forces of the United States must be prepared to conduct a complex set of military operations simultaneously across and within theaters. A combat operation to contain a major conflict in one part of the world may be taking place alongside a number of supporting and independent operations to reinforce peace, provide foreign humanitarian assistance, and assist civil authorities. The military power of the United States must be prepared to fulfill both its fundamental purpose of winning the Nation's wars and provide unconditional service in support of other broad national objectives.

Application of Military Force

The use of military force is the most important military decision that the United States can make. It must be based on sound military advice, be overwhelming and decisive when used for combat, and remain clear in purpose and resolute in action.

The use of military force is the most important military decision that the United States can make. It is a civilian decision, based on sound military advice. There are no unbending rules to handling the countless possible crises, but the following important considerations inform the decision making process. When the use of military force is considered, that use should be linked to discernible national interests; have a clearly defined and achievable mission, end state, termination conditions, and exit strategy; and include overwhelming and decisive force for combat. It should also have a campaign plan showing the path to success with measurable milestones; provide for

alternative courses of action if the military action is unsuccessful; integrate national and international agencies and the other instruments of national power; seek the support of multinational partners; and ensure the support of the American people. Once the President makes the decision, the use of military force must remain very clear in purpose and resolute in action.

US national military strategy guides the Armed Forces to achieve national security objectives. To defend US interests worldwide, the Armed Forces must have the unambiguous ability to fight and win in large-scale, sustained combat operations abroad.

The US national military strategy guides the Armed Forces in employing their resources to achieve national security and defense objectives in peace, crisis, and conflict. These objectives traditionally include promoting a stable international order that promotes democracy, economic well-being, and peaceful change. Military forces can provide a degree of security to deter or contain violence in a region so that democratic processes can address the root causes of societal dysfunctions and conflict. Military forces contribute significantly to deterrence by presenting visible evidence of their ability to decisively defeat aggression. Defense of US interests worldwide entails the unambiguous ability of the Armed Forces of the United States to fight and win in large-scale, sustained combat operations abroad. In addition, simultaneous occurrence of challenges and threats to US interests worldwide often require concurrent commitment of US forces to a variety of relatively small-scale contingency operations.

The ability to commit US military power in defense of national security depends on readiness and posture, guided by enduring concepts.

The ability to commit US military power depends on the posture and readiness of the forces. A set of enduring concepts assists the Armed Forces of the United States in this regard. **Strategic agility** addresses the ability to adapt, conceptually and physically, to changes in the international security environment. **Overseas presence**, which includes permanently stationed and rotationally or temporarily deployed forces forward in important regions, helps shape the security environment to directly advance and defend US interests. **Force projection** is the military dimension of national **power projection**. It is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the continental United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. **Decisive force** entails forces powerful enough to unequivocally and rapidly defeat an opponent. Campaigns use these concepts in a timely manner, sequenced and integrated with the other instruments of national power, to achieve US strategic aims. Campaigns may include **forcible entry** to establish a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition, and must provide

for **timely application of military power** in a manner that accomplishes the mission while making every effort to ensure the combat capability and survival of the men and women in uniform and supporting the force.

Fundamentals of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations

Campaigns are joint. They are the central organizing instrument for joint warfare.

The campaign is the central organizing instrument for joint warfare. Campaigns, by their nature, are joint undertakings. They are planned and executed by applying operational art. The joint operational art encompasses the translation of national security and military strategies into operational design for the joint employment of forces at all levels of war. Combatant commands develop command and theater strategies to apply the joint operational art to their contemporary missions and situations. The purpose of these command and theater strategies is to assure unified action by all command components and supporting commands. Unified action under the overall direction of the combatant commander will then be able to encompass the actions of military, interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental organizations in execution of the campaign plan.

The Armed Forces routinely operate in the interagency environment. Unified action in pursuit of national objectives requires early inclusion of interagency considerations.

The Armed Forces of the United States routinely participate with other governmental entities in interagency operations, in the United States and abroad. Early inclusion of interagency considerations in military assessments, estimates, and plans will facilitate civil-military integration of effort. The interagency process in the United States, under the National Security Council, focuses on the appropriate functions for military and nonmilitary participants and facilitates unified action in pursuit of national objectives. Overseas, ordinarily the US ambassador and the country team take the lead for interagency operations. For domestic interagency operations that may require that the Armed Forces support civil authorities, the Federal Emergency Management Agency has the lead for crises precipitated by natural and man-made disasters and civil defense. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has the domestic lead for crises relating to terrorism. The United States Joint Forces Command is responsible for providing military assistance to the appropriate civil authorities within the United States for managing and mitigating the consequences of terrorist employment of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons and other high-yield explosive weapons.

The Armed Forces of the United States must be prepared to operate abroad within a multinational framework, and should be prepared to operate under other-than-US leadership. However, US forces must maintain the ability to operate unilaterally across the range of military operations.

Since the Revolutionary War, American military operations have benefited from participation by other like-minded countries. The Armed Forces of the United States must be prepared to operate abroad within a multinational framework, and should be prepared to operate under other-than-US leadership. However, US forces must maintain the ability to operate unilaterally across the range of military operations. US multinational operations adhere to four tenets. **Respect** confirms the importance of genuine partnership and includes due regard to each partner's culture, religion, customs, history, and values. **Rapport** is a personal direct relationship that facilitates teamwork and unity of effort. **Knowledge of partners** is vital, and as important to success as knowledge of the enemy. **Patience** is needed because it takes time to establish respect, rapport, knowledge of each other, and understanding and agreement on the best methods of accomplishing the common mission. Unity of effort, assuring unified action, for multinational operations requires clear and effective command and control structures. Consensus and compromise are vital in multinational military operations characterized by voluntary participation by the partners who retain their sovereignty and national interests.

Addressing the Future

Joint doctrine establishes the foundation for addressing the future.

The Armed Forces of the United States simultaneously participate in shaping the strategic environment to prevent war, respond when deterrence fails, and prepare for an uncertain future. Joint doctrine establishes the foundation for addressing the future for the Armed Forces. Joint operational concepts focused on plausible future environments and military requirements assist the Armed Forces in developing concepts for future joint operations and force development activities under control of the responsible Services, commands, and agencies, and facilitating interagency and multinational efforts aimed at future operations.

Shaping the future in the present calls for a blend of continuity and audacious innovation.

Shaping the future in the present calls for a blend of continuity and audacious innovation. Analysis supported by modeling, simulation, and experimentation has a vital role in developing the future Armed Forces of the United States. Joint experimentation, a concepts-based process focused on the capabilities required by future joint force commanders, is an essential component of addressing the future.

Both the human and technological dimensions of warfare in the future are vital.

Five groups of institutions assist the Armed Forces of the United States in shaping the future: US Military Services; combatant commands; multinational partners; educational and research institutions and other nonmilitary agencies; and industry.

Both the human and technological dimensions of warfare in the future are vital. Academe has a significant role, since US educational and research institutions play unique roles in establishing and furthering societal values and, with commercial and nonprofit laboratories, are the centers of scientific and technological innovation. Shaping the future capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States is a collaborative responsibility of **five major groups of institutions** in contemporary society. These include: the **Military Services and other organizations** charged with future force development, **combatant commands** responsible for ensuring interoperability and coherence of joint operations, **multinational partners** without whose assistance US interests may be irreparably compromised, **nonmilitary agencies including educational and research institutions** that are responsible for the majority of societal activities, and **industry** with its unique roles in enhancing the general welfare and providing the bulk of the capacity for realizing military innovation.

CONCLUSION

The Armed Forces of the United States are the instruments of the people exercised through their constitutional duly-elected and appointed civilian leaders. They must be prepared to **fight and win** against any foe under any circumstances, and to **assist civil authorities** in meeting challenges that cannot be adequately addressed by nonmilitary institutions. The Armed Forces must reflect and support the highest values of American society.

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CHAPTER I

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

“Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.”

GEN George H. Decker, USA

The Armed Forces of the United States hold in trust for the American people the military power of the Nation and are the ultimate guarantors of its territorial integrity and independence against all adversaries. Fundamental concepts of national security and the principles of the military profession in democratic societies establish the general character of the Armed Forces. Contemporary assessments of the international security environment, the interests of the United States, and the will of the citizenry expressed through US constitutional institutions guide the Armed Forces in developing their capabilities. Military doctrine establishes principles that provide direction for the employment of those capabilities.

1. National Security — Developing Strategy and Policy

National security is among the fundamental national purposes that the American people embedded in the Constitution. The United States relies on the complementary application of the basic instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, informational, and military) for its security. Under the framework of shared responsibilities set out by the Constitution, the United States establishes specific policies and strategies in order to preserve its values, to identify its interests, and to assure the best use of its resources in advancing its interests and defending the security of the Republic and its citizens.

In order to be relevant to the contemporary international security environment, national security policy and strategy must be guided by a clear understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military action. US military leaders therefore have constitutional, legal, and professional obligations to provide advice and recommendations on the military aspects of national security to national leaders in the executive and legislative branches. These obligations include advice and recommendations on the use of force, the development and employment of military forces, and the integration of military planning and actions with the other instruments of national power. Combatant commanders also have the unique responsibility for effective execution of military actions under the National Command Authorities (NCA) in furtherance of national security policy and strategy.

a. **Participants.** Developing national security policy and strategy involves the interaction of the highest level US civilian and military authorities, principally the President and the members of the National Security Council (NSC). Supporting these primary participants are the senior officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the individual Services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the combatant commanders, and a number of agencies with unique defense responsibilities.

"[My job is] to give the President and Secretary of Defense military advice before they know they need it."

**GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA,
Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff**

- **National Command Authorities.** The NCA, which consist of the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors, are the highest levels in the military chain of command. The NCA exercise authority over the Armed Forces both through the combatant commanders for those forces assigned to combatant commands, through the Secretaries of the Military Departments for those forces not assigned to combatant commands, and through the Secretary of Transportation for the US Coast Guard.
- **National Security Council.** The President chairs the NSC. In addition to the President and Vice President, the NSC's statutory members are the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council and discharges the responsibility for professional military advice and recommendations in this forum as well as in other ways as stipulated by the NCA. The Director of Central Intelligence is the NSC's statutory intelligence advisor.
- **Department of Defense.** The supporting participants in the Department of Defense (DOD) — the individual Services, combatant commands, and agencies — provide their advice and recommendations through the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the American system of civil-military relations, civilian-elected officials and their duly appointed

subordinates have primary responsibility for broad national policies and procedures that reflect the will of the people. Military officials have primary responsibility for advice and recommendations on professional military matters including capabilities, limitations, and implications of military action, as well as for commanding the military forces in carrying out their assigned missions.

b. **Processes.** Under the direction of the NCA, the Armed Forces of the United States participate in US national security activities guided by the following interrelated planning systems and associated processes (Figure I-1).

- **NSC System.** The NSC is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters. The NSC functions to advise and assist the President by presenting assessments and options for decision that reflect all relevant government agencies and considerations. The NSC also coordinates the dissemination and monitors the implementation of Presidential and other high-level national security decisions among the various government agencies. The NSC prepares, disseminates, and oversees execution of Presidential national security decisions and directives, the US National Security Strategy (NSS), and other directives that provide the basis for military action.
- **Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).** The PPBS, presided over by the Secretary of Defense, has as its primary objective the allocation of resources needed by the Armed Forces of the United States to execute military aspects of the NSS and the National Military Strategy (NMS). The PPBS enables the Services and selected commands and agencies to




Figure I-1. National Security Planning Processes

develop and sustain necessary military capabilities. Under this system, the Department of Defense translates requirements for forces, personnel, materiel, and facilities into budgetary requirements to be presented to the President for approval and to the Congress for authorization and appropriation. The principal participants in this system are civilian leaders in the OSD, and the individual Services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The PPBS system assures professional military advice by the participation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other members of the JCS, the combatant commanders, and selected Defense agency officials.

- **Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).** The JSPS is the primary formal system by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the JCS and the combatant commanders, provides military advice to the NCA and

recommendations to the PPBS. JSPS products — such as the NMS and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan — provide guidance and instructions on military policy, strategy, plans, forces, and resource requirements and allocations essential to successful execution of the NSS and other Presidential directives. They also provide a means to evaluate extant US military capabilities, to assess the adequacy and risk associated with current programs and budgets, and to propose changes for NCA and Congressional approval.

- **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).** The JOPES is the principal DOD system for translating policy decisions into operation plans and orders in order to make the most effective use of US military capabilities and to meet US requirements for the employment of military forces. The JOPES includes deliberate and crisis action planning

processes. It guides US military action during crises and transition to operations through rapid, coordinated planning and implementation of plans. Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes.

2. The Political Context

The Armed Forces of the United States operate in a democratic political context that enables the American people to express their views and preferences about the employment of military forces. In due course, those views influence the use of the military instrument, including the scope and limitations of military action. Under the Constitution's framework, American military power operates for and under the conditions determined by the people through their elected representatives. This political context establishes the objectives and the limits of legitimate military action in peace, crisis, and conflict in the United States and abroad.

"Our armies must be subject to ultimate civilian control and command at all times, in war as well as peace. The basic decisions on our participation in any conflict and our response to any threat — including all decisions relating to the use of nuclear weapons, or the escalation of a small war into a large one — will be made by the regularly constituted civilian authorities."

President John F. Kennedy

a. Peace, Crisis, and Conflict

- In **peace**, the political imperative for the Armed Forces of the United States is to maintain visible, credible military capability and readiness for employment across the range of military operations.

Demonstrated military capability is the cornerstone of deterrence, which remains a principal means for dissuading would-be aggressors and adversaries from action harmful to the United States. Within the United States, primacy for action rests with civil authority, with military power playing a supporting role. Interagency task forces with civilian agency and military participation, and with civilian officials in charge, are the norm. In countries abroad, US military activities undertaken outside the established procedures of formal alliances and similar international arrangements fall under the oversight of the US ambassador and the country team, with command authority over US forces remaining under a US military commander.

- During **crisis**, US military authorities focus on military activities that bolster deterrence in conjunction with coordinated actions by civil authorities in charge of the other instruments of national power. The NSC has a lead role in managing crises that may involve military action. When military support for predominantly civilian noncombat activities is envisioned, other US governmental agencies may assume the lead role. Essential military considerations during crisis include preplanned and specially tailored flexible options to bolster deterrence and ensure rapid and effective transition to conflict including war.
- During **conflict**, the principal responsibility of the Armed Forces of the United States is to employ rapid and decisive military power to achieve US objectives in a manner that sustains the fruits of success in the postconflict environment. Conflict encompasses combat (including formally declared war) or situations in which there is a risk of combat, such as those that result in

multinational peace operations. The rapidity and visible capability of US force deployments alone may be sufficient to deter conflict expansion and achieve US objectives. In conflict situations, US military commanders adhere to US joint doctrine and ratified multinational doctrine, and integrate their efforts with multinational and interagency partners. They also integrate the actions of the military instrument with those of the civil authorities responsible for the other instruments of national power. Joint US military operations are normally integrated with US and foreign military and civil organizations in pursuit of common or complementary objectives.

b. Public Opinion. The opinions of the American citizenry, and of peoples elsewhere, concerning the legitimacy, appropriateness, and effectiveness of US military action have an important effect on the activities of the Armed Forces of the United States. Public opinion influences the ability of the Armed Forces to accomplish their missions and to prepare for future uses of US military power. US military leaders are responsible for providing timely and accurate information to the citizenry concerning the activities of the Armed Forces of the United States. The

responsibility of US military leaders to the public is complementary to, not in conflict with, their responsibility for providing confidential professional military advice to the NCA in support of the Constitution. Similarly, US military leaders are responsible for providing professional military advice and recommendations as well as timely and complete information to the Legislative Branch in order to enable it to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities for military affairs.

c. Legal Considerations. The United States adheres to domestic and international law governing warfare. The United States also supports human rights worldwide, and conforms to customary international law and those international legal conventions and prescriptions supporting human rights to which it is a party. These considerations apply to the Armed Forces of the United States across the range of military operations.

3. Instruments of National Power

The ability of the United States to influence events to its advantage worldwide depends in large measure on the will of its citizenry, the vitality of its societal institutions, the strength



Demonstrated military capability is the cornerstone of deterrence.

of its relations with like-minded multinational partners, and the effectiveness of the Government in employing the instruments of national power (Figure I-2). These instruments are diplomatic, economic, informational, and military and are normally coordinated by the appropriate Executive Branch officials often with NSC assistance. They are the tools the United States uses to apply its sources of power; including its human potential, economy, industry, science and technology, academic institutions, geography, and national will.

The NCA establish the rules for and integrate military power with the other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. To accomplish this integration, the Armed Forces interact with the other responsible agencies to ensure mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and civilian actions, and to identify the ways in which military and nonmilitary

capabilities best complement each other. The NSC plays key roles in the integration of all the instruments of national power, facilitating mutual understanding, cooperation, and integration of effort, as well as adherence to Presidential and other national-level directives.

a. **The Diplomatic Instrument.** The diplomatic instrument of national power is the principal instrument for accomplishing engagement with other states and foreign groups in order to advance US values, interests, and objectives. However, without the credible threat of force, diplomacy historically is inadequate against a determined and powerful adversary. Leaders of the Armed Forces of the United States have a responsibility to understand US foreign policy and to assure that those responsible for US diplomacy have a clear understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military action. Combatant commanders are responsible for integrating military activities




Figure I-2. Instruments of National Power

with diplomatic activities in their geographic regions. The US ambassador and the corresponding country team are normally in charge of diplomatic-military activities in countries abroad. When directed by the NCA, the combatant commander employs military forces in concert with the other instruments of national power. In these circumstances, the US ambassador and the country team may have complementary activities (employing the diplomatic instrument) that do not entail control of military forces, which remain under command authority of the combatant commander.

b. The Economic Instrument. The economic instrument of national power is only partially controlled by governmental agencies. In keeping with US values and constitutional imperatives, American individuals and entities have broad freedom of action abroad. The responsibility of the US Government (USG) lies with facilitating economic and trade relationships worldwide that promote US fundamental objectives, such as promoting general welfare and supporting security interests and objectives. A strong domestic US economy with free access to global markets and resources is a fundamental engine of the general welfare, the guarantor of a strong national defense, and an influence for economic expansion by US trade partners worldwide. The Armed Forces must coordinate with USG agencies responsible for employing the economic instrument to facilitate unity of action. The NSC has primary responsibility for the integration of the economic and military instruments of power abroad.

c. The Informational Instrument. The informational instrument of national power has a diffuse and complex set of components with no single center of control. In the American culture, information is freely exchanged with minimal government controls.

- Information itself is a strategic resource vital to national security. This reality extends to the Armed Forces at all levels. Military operations in particular are dependent on many simultaneous and integrated activities that, in turn, depend on information and information systems. Information and information-based technologies are vital elements for modern war and military operations other than war (MOOTW).
- Constraints on public access to USG information normally may be imposed only for national security and individual privacy reasons. Information readily available from multiple sources influences domestic and foreign audiences including citizens, adversaries, and governments. It is important for the official agencies of government, including the Armed Forces, to recognize the fundamental role of the media as a conduit of information. The Armed Forces must assure media access consistent with classification requirements, operations security, legal restrictions, and individual privacy. The Armed Forces must also provide timely and accurate information to the public.
- Success in military operations depends on acquiring and integrating essential information and denying it to the adversary. The Armed Forces are responsible for conducting defensive and offensive information operations, protecting what should not be disclosed, and aggressively attacking adversary information systems. Information operations may involve complex legal and policy issues that require approval, review, and coordination at the national level.

d. The Military Instrument. This publication focuses on the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. In

wielding the military instrument of national power, the Armed Forces must ensure their adherence to the values and constitutional principles of American society. They must also meet the standards for the profession of arms demanded by American society. While responsibility for wielding the other instruments of power rests outside the military establishment, US military leaders are responsible for providing the advice and recommendations necessary for the overall US effort in order to properly incorporate the military instrument with the other instruments of national power.

4. The Role of Doctrine — “An Engine of Change”

a. Joint Doctrine

- Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from experience in warfare and other operations requiring the use of the military instrument of national power. Nevertheless, doctrine does not replace or alter a commander’s authority and obligation to determine the proper course of action (COA) under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision.
- Joint doctrine enables the Armed Forces of the United States to conduct the most effective joint activities and unified action. Joint doctrine is based on extant capabilities and incorporates time-tested principles for successful military action as well as contemporary lessons that together guide aggressive exploitation of US advantages against adversary vulnerabilities. It does this by promoting a common perspective from which to plan, train, and conduct military operations in combat and noncombat situations. It also fundamentally shapes the way the Armed Forces think about

the use of the military instrument of national power.

- Though neither policy nor strategy, **joint doctrine serves to make US policy and strategy effective** in the application of US military power. Joint doctrine and its supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures focus on how best to employ the Armed Forces in order to achieve US objectives at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the statutory responsibility to develop and disseminate joint doctrine, and does so in coordination with the Services and combatant commands. As such, joint doctrine is authoritative guidance and will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. Joint



Joint doctrine enables the most effective joint activities and unified action.

doctrine applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, combat support agencies, and other Defense agencies. Joint doctrine takes precedence over individual Service doctrines, which must be consistent with joint doctrine. When the Armed Forces of the United States participate in multinational operations, US commanders should follow multinational doctrine and procedures that have been ratified by the United States. For multinational doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures where applicable.

b. Evolution of Doctrine. Joint doctrine — an “engine of change” — serves as an important method for implementing change as forces train and build effective joint teams. It facilitates development of a common joint culture from which to integrate Service cultures and doctrines. The joint doctrine development process provides the conceptual basis by which Armed Forces assess, review,

and revise doctrine and concepts for the future. The continuous application of joint doctrine in training and leader development also encourages development of new and innovative capabilities — including joint tactics, techniques, and procedures — that improve upon extant capabilities. Because the Armed Forces of the United States operate and fight jointly, all the men and women in its ranks must learn and practice joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. Feedback to the doctrine process from joint exercises and operations is essential for the continuing vitality and improvement of joint doctrine and the consistency of Service doctrine and procedures. This process of deliberate and experience-based doctrinal change is crucial for the present and future effectiveness of the Armed Forces of the United States.

“Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, especially an adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare. Doctrine must continue to evolve based on growing experience, advancements in theory, and the changing face of war itself.”

Gen Charles C. Krulak, USMC

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CHAPTER II

THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

“The superpower conflict is over, but many complex and dangerous challenges remain. The enemy we face today is instability and unpredictability. It is a virulent drug trade, and the spread of the weapons of mass destruction. And it is terrorism, the weapon of cowards and malcontents.”

President George Bush

1. Introduction

a. The international security environment is dynamic and uncertain, with recurring disputes, crises, and conflicts in many regions as well as endemic conflicts in regions of particular importance to the security of the United States. Challenges and threats may arise from adversaries who are inherently opposed to US values, power, and role in the international system, or from adversaries for whom the United States presents an obstacle to their specific objectives. These adversaries may be states or groups of states as well as nonstate groups, including terrorist, criminal, ethnic, religious, and special-interest organizations. While states have defined territorial and population bases of power, nonstate groups may rely on state sponsorship, have transnational bases of power, or rely on the support of adherents to their points of view regardless of citizenship or place of residence.

b. The United States and its key allies and like-minded partners exercise significant influence on current events and have important roles in determining the nature of the future. The Armed Forces of the United States have the responsibility to shape and employ the military instrument of power to advance and defend US interests in this turbulent international security environment.

2. Threats to US Interests

a. The complex range of threats to US interests arises from the perspectives and

actions of a variety of potential adversaries. Some states aspire to global influence and act to achieve that influence in ways that are harmful to US interests. Other states may seek to enhance their power and influence by opposing US interests and objectives within their regions. Territorial disputes and armed conflicts spurred by social, ethnic, and religious differences, as well as civil wars, pose threats to regional and international peace. Man-made or natural disasters may also threaten US interests within the United States and abroad. While contemporary assessments of US interests and threats to those interests evolve over time to conform to reality, joint doctrine provides broad guidelines that are not limited solely to a single, unique assessment or period of time. When the environment, interests, and threats change significantly — as occurred following the end of the Cold War — joint doctrine also evolves to conform to the new reality. The Armed Forces of the United States must take into account the entire range of challenges and threats to the United States. Military assessments and estimates must include threats abroad as well as the projections of those threats to US territory.

b. In assessing threats, it is essential to understand clearly what is being threatened. The United States holds as most dangerous the threats to its fundamental well-being, territory, and safety; these vital interests include US social and economic infrastructures. Threats to the vital interests of US allies may also threaten the United States.

c. The United States exists in a community of interdependent states. Threats to the international norms of state behavior, to global democratic and economic progress, and to the global environment also threaten important US interests. The United States also has an interest in promoting the values of individual worth, human rights, and democratic self-determination that are at the core of the American social contract. Threats to those values abroad compromise US efforts to create a hospitable international environment.

- **Regional and Space Threats.** A number of states have the capability to threaten US vital interests in overseas regions through aggression and coercion. If unchecked, these threats may constrain or interrupt the flows of resources and commerce that are vital to the economic well-being of the United States, its allies, and other states. Some regional powers also have long-range delivery systems as well as clandestine means to threaten the territories of the United States and its allies. Similarly, regional powers may have the capability to threaten the flow of vital information and communications that rely on space-based systems. Unimpeded access and freedom to operate in space are essential to protecting US vital interests.
- **Transnational Threats.** A number of nonstate groups pursue objectives directly threatening to US vital and other important interests. These include organizations that have the means and motivation to employ terrorism, conduct attacks on critical infrastructures, engage in international crime, and direct illicit drug and arms traffic. Uncontrolled refugee migrations resulting from conflict or environmental causes threaten to overwhelm the capabilities of international organizations, the United States, and other countries, upsetting regional economic and political stability.

The global diffusion of sophisticated technologies and means of communication permit US adversaries to achieve transnational reach even into US territory. Moreover, adversaries not party to an ongoing conflict may seize that opportunity for their own purposes and hold US interests at risk, perhaps at locations beyond the region in which the conflict is taking place, including US territory. Taken together, these transnational threats challenge the Armed Forces to assess likely threats beyond the immediate regions of disputes, crises, and conflicts.

- **Weapons of Mass Destruction.** Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction pose a significant threat to US interests worldwide. In the hands of regional and nonstate groups, these weapons may be used in a widespread manner or against specific point targets of particularly high value to the United States. These weapons include nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons as well as other weapons capable of a high order of destruction or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. In addition to their direct physical effects, the threat or use of these weapons will have significant psychological effects in the immediate target area and in other vulnerable areas that may be potential targets.
- **Spread of Dangerous Technologies.** The global diffusion of knowledge, improved communications capabilities, and sophisticated technologies empowers adversaries and facilitates their development of capabilities that may attempt to exploit vulnerabilities of the United States, its allies, and other friendly states. The United States, with cooperation from like-minded states and nonstate groups, seeks to limit the



Weapons of mass destruction pose a significant threat to US interests.

dissemination of dangerous technologies (such as advanced weapon and missile technologies) in order to contain this threat.

- **Failed States.** Governments under pressure from internal and external forces — social, economic, or military — may lose their ability to meet even the minimal expectations of their citizens. “Failed” states may become powerless to prevent internal conflict, massive killing, vast migrations, environmental disasters, loss of control of their armed forces, and armed conflict with neighboring states. The uncontrolled violence in failed states, therefore, can threaten neighboring states and groups, US citizens and interests in the region, and require US and international assistance.
- **Foreign Intelligence Collection.** Foreign threats may exploit the versatility of human intelligence as well as the advances in science and technology, thus presenting a range of traditional and new challenges to the instruments of national power. Invasive intelligence operations may use common and specialized global information networks to penetrate key US governmental and private

organizations as well as their unclassified and classified data systems and individual computers.

- **Asymmetric Threats.** Contemporary threats share an important characteristic with past threats. A timeless and fundamental principle of the profession of arms is to avoid the strengths and focus on the vulnerabilities that will most rapidly and decisively cause the opponent’s defeat. The capabilities of American military power make it difficult for any adversary to develop a symmetrical force that mirrors that of the United States. The Armed Forces of the United States must, therefore, expect adversaries — whether states or nonstate groups — to seek to exploit asymmetries and focus on US vulnerabilities. Combatant commanders must anticipate asymmetric threats in preparing for and conducting joint, multinational, and interagency operations.

3. Assessing the National Strategic Situation

- a. US national security demands periodic assessments of the adequacy of strategies and resources available to achieve national



Terrorist bombings such as the Khobar Towers attack are an example of asymmetric attack that must be anticipated and for which military forces must prepare.

security objectives. Unity of effort is essential for timely and accurate assessments and for actions taken in light of the assessments. Ordinarily, the NSC is the lead agency for this effort. The Armed Forces routinely carry out assessments of the effectiveness of the military instrument in accomplishing national objectives, and contribute to the assessment of the effectiveness of the other instruments (diplomatic, economic, and informational). These assessments inform US leaders in the executive and legislative branches, and when security permits, the general public.

b. Developing assessments of national strategic issues requires the coordinated and integrated action of the USG agencies responsible for wielding the instruments of national power. When the military instrument is employed in coordination with other instruments, the NSC normally coordinates the effort. In wielding the economic and informational instruments, the United States must be cognizant of the significant role of the private sector in these arenas. As a result, the Armed Forces and the other USG agencies that have responsibilities and activities in these areas must incorporate private sector perspectives into their assessments of strategic issues.

- **Military Participation.** Military leaders have fundamental responsibilities and roles in the assessment of national strategic issues. Specific tasks and methods of participation will be stipulated in NCA directives and instructions from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to the roles discharged by the Chairman and the other members of the JCS, the combatant commanders have unique roles. In view of their assigned missions and/or geographic responsibilities, the combatant commanders provide assessments of threats, strategies, and resources to support national assessments of strategic issues. The fundamental purpose of professional military participation in the development of these assessments is to fulfill military responsibilities in the US system of civil-military relations. Specifically, senior military leaders provide advice and recommendations on the feasible military options, resources required, and anticipated consequences of military action. They also are uniquely responsible for developing the military components of operation plans

developed as a consequence of decisions prompted by national strategic assessments.

- **Interagency Participation.** The NSC is responsible for guiding and coordinating interagency participation in strategic assessments. The NSC is also responsible for assisting the President in actions taken to execute plans and activities that result from these assessments. Contingency operations, particularly peace operations, require a high degree of integrated and synchronized interagency participation. These operations call for assessments that involve a wide range of nonmilitary agencies.
- **Executive Committee Participation.** To assist in assessments of strategic situations, development of policy and options, and planning and execution of interagency operations, the NSC may organize an executive committee consisting of high-level officials of participating agencies, including those not normally part of the NSC structure. This committee, with appropriate professional military representation, may develop organizational arrangements to integrate interagency efforts, monitor their progress, and assess their operations. For example, the executive committee may be tasked to manage day-to-day interagency planning and integration in complex peace operations.
- **Political-Military Plans and Rehearsals.** Due to their complexity, situations that call for significant military and nonmilitary participation will require specific political-military plans cooperatively developed by the participants, under the coordination of the NSC and its executive committee (if activated for the situation at hand). To

the maximum extent feasible prior to execution, all participants at the appropriate level will rehearse these political-military plans.

Appendix A, “The Strategic Estimate,” provides a guide for developing assessments of national strategic issues.

4. Operations and Conflict Termination

National political objectives guide military action. This includes establishment of supporting military objectives, development of strategies and plans to achieve the objectives, conduct of operations, and definition of criteria for cessation of operations. These national objectives also influence requirements for military operations and support to achieve the desired end state and maintain it in the theater following cessation of operations.

a. Military plans and operations serve to support the attainment of the overarching political objectives that give rise to military involvement. Therefore, military plans and operations must focus both on achieving the political objectives and on establishing the military conditions necessary to sustain the objectives following cessation of military operations. This calls for planning based on the desired end state, ensuring that the longer-term postconflict environment called for by US political objectives is preserved following conclusion of military involvement. Military plans at all levels should therefore include consideration of conditions under which conflict termination and termination of military involvement can be executed.

“The formulation of a clear and precise mission statement which defines measurable and attainable objectives is paramount.”

Gen Joseph P. Hoar, USMC



**The Medal of Honor is Awarded to
Signalman First Class Douglas Albert Munro, United States Coast Guard**

Signalman First Class Munro was Petty Officer in Charge of a group of 24 Higgins boats, engaged in the evacuation of a battalion of marines trapped by enemy Japanese forces at Point Cruz Guadalcanal, on 27 September 1942. After making preliminary plans for the evacuation of nearly 500 beleaguered marines, Munro, under constant strafing by enemy machineguns on the island, and at great risk of his life, daringly led 5 of his small craft toward the shore. As he closed the beach, he signaled the others to land, and then in order to draw the enemy's fire and protect the heavily loaded boats, he valiantly placed his craft with its 2 small guns as a shield between the beachhead and the Japanese. When the perilous task of evacuation was nearly completed, Munro was instantly killed by enemy fire, but his crew, 2 of whom were wounded, carried on until the last boat had loaded and cleared the beach. By his outstanding leadership, expert planning, and dauntless devotion to duty, he and his courageous comrades undoubtedly saved the lives of many who otherwise would have perished. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

b. Senior military leaders have a responsibility to clarify to the NCA and other civilian leaders the military aspects of operations. This includes the manner by which military force will achieve and sustain political objectives, considerations for conflict termination, and the potential need for follow-on operations. Military advice and recommendations on conflict termination have political and military dimensions.

- **Political.** Control of Armed Forces of the United States participation in joint, multinational, and interagency operations rests with the NCA, assisted by the NSC and any groups specifically empowered by the NCA to accomplish this task. Participation of US forces with other countries, international bodies, and other designated groups must be authorized by the NCA. Clear political objectives established in advance of military planning and operations facilitate determination of supporting military objectives aimed at achieving the desired

end state. Nevertheless, combatant commanders must be prepared to adapt to unforeseen events and to the evolution of political objectives as the situation develops.

- **Military.** The combatant commander is responsible for executing the military dimensions of conflict termination as directed by the NCA. Military considerations for conflict termination are an essential element in national strategic assessments that guide operations across the range of military operations. Combatant commanders should infuse in the fighting forces an attitude of willing joint integration of effort, based on joint doctrine, and recognize that all forms of combat power present advantages for exploitation. The remainder of this publication provides context and describes the principles that guide military operations in combat and noncombat situations, both abroad and in the United States.

CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES MILITARY POWER

“No matter where we fight in the future, no matter what the circumstances, we will fight as a joint team. We will have fingers on the team that are individual Services, but when it comes to the fight we want the closed, clenched fist of American military power. The days of single Service warfare are gone forever.”

ADM David E. Jeremiah, USN

1. The Purpose of the Military

a. The Armed Forces of the United States fulfill the constitutional imperative to provide the common defense. They are the sole instrument that enforces national will by the threat or employment of organized violence. **The fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces is to win the Nation’s wars.** Success in combat in defense of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, societal values, and national interests is the essential goal and measure of value of the profession of arms in American society.

b. The Armed Forces also serve to advance and defend other important national interests and objectives, including participation in operations that do not envision combat, as directed by the NCA. American military forces have a long history of unconditional service in operations that support broad national purposes. From surveying railroad rights-of-way in the 19th century to participating in humanitarian relief efforts for victims of natural disasters in the present, the Armed Forces maintain as their inherent secondary purpose the advancement and protection of national interests in MOOTW.

2. National Military Objectives

The operations of the Armed Forces focus on military objectives derived from preeminent national political objectives. The range of military action as well as the geographical location of the United States

define particular characteristics that US military power must exhibit to achieve its military objectives. The Armed Forces of the United States must be able to successfully accomplish a wide variety of missions and tasks. They must possess capabilities across the full range of potential military operations, including the ability to deploy rapidly from the United States or other locations to the theater of focus.

a. **Promote Peace and Stability.** In pursuit of its national interests, the United States seeks to influence the character of the international security environment. An international order hospitable to US values, democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law facilitates both promotion of the general welfare and the common defense. Peaceful progress and peaceful resolution of disputes are at the core of US interests abroad.

- Stability is not an end in itself. It is a desirable characteristic of a theater strategic environment that enables the United States to achieve its objectives abroad, but may not be desirable in environments that threaten US interests.
- American military power has vital roles in encouraging, promoting, and preserving an environment favorable to US interests abroad. Most important is maintaining the **visible ability to act rapidly and decisively** in regions of US interests, in combat or noncombat operations. This central capability relies

on the combination of several factors: the presence of forces in a region; the ability to tailor an appropriate package of additional forces that may be required from locations outside the region; and their rapid deployment (if required) and employment to overcome challenges and preserve US interests in the region.

- **Deterrence** is a central concept in shaping and employing the Armed Forces. The force development activities of the Services, the USSOCOM, and other agencies focus their efforts on effective forces that can discourage potential threats to US interests. Doctrine, employment concepts, and training reinforce these capabilities with visible evidence to reduce the possibility of miscalculation by a challenger or potential adversary. Force readiness and military professionalism lessen the risk of having to fight at all. If deterrence fails, then the preeminent military objective is winning the war. When American Service men and women fight, they fight to win.

“The ultimate promise of our doctrine is its potential to accomplish the mission, achieve the warfighter’s objectives, and not insignificantly, to save lives on the battlefield.”

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF

b. **Defeat Adversaries.** The Armed Forces of the United States develop their capabilities for prompt, sustained engagement and decisive defeat of adversaries worldwide. Force development exploits fully the capabilities of the individual and the best available technology, guided by joint doctrine that seeks to maximize the effects of American combat power.

- American arms seek rapid **decision** in simultaneous application of all appropriate dimensions of combat power

against adversary centers of gravity (COGs) and vulnerabilities. US forces seek to destroy or neutralize the adversary’s capability for organized resistance and to facilitate post-combat termination objectives. This central end orients the actions of Services and others in force development, establishes the purpose of joint doctrine, and guides the actions of combatant commanders in preparing their assigned forces.

- The United States requires decisive, **overwhelming military capabilities**. This characteristic of American military power influences the application of the time-tested principles of war and serves as the basis for deriving subordinate fundamentals of joint operations.

3. Core Military Competencies

In pursuit of its roles in peace and war, the Armed Forces of the United States develop and maintain core military capabilities that enable their success across the range of military operations. At the highest professional levels, senior leaders develop joint warfighting core competencies that are the capstone to American military power. The Services, USSOCOM, and other agencies develop capabilities oriented on their core competencies embodied in tradition, law, and NCA directives.

a. **Military Competencies at Senior Levels.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other members of the JCS, and the combatant commanders have unique responsibilities for planning and directing the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. This is their core competency. The combination of joint professional military education, as well as progressive and sequential assignments toward higher levels of joint operations, supports the development and continuous revitalization of this core competency. It is supported by the systems



Organizing, training, and equipping force elements are part of the military core competencies.

that prepare and assign the most competent officers to the staffs that support these senior military leaders.

b. Military Competencies of the Armed Forces. The Services, USSOCOM, and defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency) that develop and provide force elements to combatant commands have the primary responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces for joint employment in accordance with joint doctrine. These force elements enable the Services, USSOCOM, and agencies to carry out their respective responsibilities. These force elements undergo periodic review at the national level to ensure that there are no capability gaps or unwanted overlaps, and that they are appropriately integrated for successful mission accomplishment by combatant commands. The combatant commanders are responsible for the integration of military core competencies across all the forces at their disposal. This integration should be based on joint doctrine and take account of all force characteristics (including personnel and materiel, training, and leader development) in order to facilitate coherent joint operations.

“With the draw-down of our forces over the years, each of the Services has become more and more dependent on the other. In fact I can think of very few instances where any one Service is capable of doing the challenging jobs that are presented to us in today’s world by itself. Each of us brings a particular core competency to the missions that are presented to the joint force commander and presents that core competency to the joint force commander for him to be able to layer, overlap and use the force the way he needs to be able to accomplish his mission. We will be forever dependent on each other for the missions that challenge the nation today.”

Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF

4. Joint Warfighting

a. Joint warfare is team warfare. The engagement of forces is not a series of individual performances linked by a common theme; rather, it is the integrated and synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities. The synergy that results from the operations of joint forces according to joint doctrine maximizes combat capability in

unified action. Joint warfare does not require that all forces participate in a particular operation merely because they are available. The joint force commander (JFC) has the authority and responsibility to tailor forces for the mission at hand, selecting those that most effectively and efficiently ensure success.

Joint Warfare is Team Warfare

“When a team takes to the field, individual specialists come together to achieve a team win. All players try to do their very best because every other player, the team, and the home town are counting on them to win.

So it is when the Armed Forces of the United States go to war. We must win every time.

Every soldier must take the battlefield believing his or her unit is the best in the world.

Every pilot must take off believing there is no one better in the sky.

Every sailor standing watch must believe there is no better ship at sea.

Every Marine must hit the beach believing that there are no better infantrymen in the world.

But they all must also believe that they are part of a team, a joint team, that fights together to win.

This is our history, this is our tradition, this is our future.”

**GEN Colin L. Powell, USA
Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff**

b. **War is a human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules.** Indeed, the rapid advance of technology and the diversity of threats to national interests have accelerated and amplified the effects of the traditional obstacles to military operations of friction, chance, and uncertainty. The cumulative effect of these obstacles is often

described as “the fog of war” and places a burden on the commander to remain responsive, versatile, and able to adjust in real time to seize opportunities and reduce vulnerabilities. This is the art of war.

c. **Values of Joint Warfare.** American military service is based on values that US military experience has proven to be the **bedrock of combat success** (Figure III-1). These values adhere to the most idealistic societal norms, are common to all the Services, and represent the essence of American military professionalism. The discussion that follows focuses on those values that have a special impact on joint matters.

- The foremost value is **integrity**. It is the cornerstone for building trust. American Service men and women must be able to rely on each other, regardless of the challenge at hand; they must individually and collectively say what they mean and do what they say. Integrity inspires confidence in others to carry out assigned tasks and is a fundamental requirement for building effective teams.
- **Competence** is at the core of the profession of arms and of the relationship



Figure III-1. Joint Warfare Values



**The Medal of Honor is Awarded to
Second Lieutenant Audie L. Murphy, United States Army**

2d Lt Murphy commanded Company B, 15th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, which was attacked by 6 tanks and waves of infantry near Holtzwihr France on 26 January 1945. 2d Lt Murphy ordered his men to withdraw to prepared positions in a woods, while he remained forward at his command post and continued to give fire directions to the artillery by telephone. Behind him, to his right, 1 of our tank destroyers received a direct hit and began to burn. Its crew withdrew to the woods. 2d Lt Murphy continued to direct artillery fire which killed large numbers of the advancing enemy infantry. With the enemy tanks abreast of his position, 2d Lt Murphy climbed on the burning tank destroyer, which was in danger of blowing up at any moment, and employed its .50 caliber machinegun against the enemy. He was alone and exposed to German fire from 3 sides, but his deadly fire killed dozens of Germans and caused their infantry attack to waver. The enemy tanks, losing infantry support, began to fall back. For an hour the Germans tried every available weapon to eliminate 2d Lt Murphy, but he continued to hold his position and wiped out a squad which was trying to creep up unnoticed on his right flank. Germans reached as close as 10 yards, only to be mowed down by his fire. He received a leg wound, but ignored it and continued the single-handed fight until his ammunition was exhausted. He then made his way to his company, refused medical attention, and organized the company in a counterattack which forced the Germans to withdraw. His directing of artillery fire wiped out many of the enemy; he killed or wounded about 50. 2d Lt Murphy's indomitable courage and his refusal to give an inch of ground saved his company from possible encirclement and destruction, and enabled it to hold the woods which had been the enemy's objective.

of the profession with the American people. Competent performance includes both the technical competence to perform the relevant task to standard as well as the ability to integrate that skill with others according to joint doctrine. The American people and multinational partners expect US military competence in every aspect of warfare. Service men and women deserve no less from those who lead them into battle. Successful joint action relies on each of the Services to deliver trained and ready, competent and confident forces and leaders, able to fight decisively under joint force commanders. For the dedicated professional, building Service competence is an intense, lifelong affair.

Moreover, many serve in assignments requiring additional competency in joint skills, and all members of the Armed Forces must understand their fellow Services to the extent required for effective operations. Those who will lead joint forces must develop skill in orchestrating air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces into smoothly functioning joint teams.

- Throughout the history of mankind, **physical courage** has defined warriors. The United States of America is blessed with its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen, whose courage knows no boundaries. Even in warfare characterized by advanced

technology, individual fighting spirit and courage remain the inspiration for teamwork.

- **Moral courage** is also essential in military operations. This includes the willingness to stand up for what one believes to be right even if that stand is unpopular or contrary to conventional wisdom. Other aspects of moral courage involve **risk taking** and **tenacity**: making bold decisions in the face of uncertainty, accepting full responsibility for the outcome, and holding to the chosen course despite challenges or difficulties. Competence is an essential foundation for moral courage. Competence separates the professional from the foolhardy. Military power must be wielded in an unimpeachable moral fashion, with respect for human rights and adherence to the Geneva Conventions. This morality should not be a matter of legality, but of conscience. Moral behavior is essential for gaining and maintaining the positive worldwide reputation of American fighting men and women as well as the confidence and support of the American people, a basic source of American military strength.
- **Teamwork** is the cooperative effort by the members of a group to achieve common goals. The Armed Forces of the United States — every military organization to the lowest level — are a team. Deterring adversaries, and when necessary, winning the Nation's wars are the team's common goals. Americans respond to and respect teamwork as an important value. This societal approval provides to the Armed Forces of the United States a solid basis upon which to build effective joint teams.
 - **Trust and confidence** are central to military unity of effort. A highly effective team is based on the team

members having trust and confidence in each other. This trust does not result from good feelings or devout wishes. Trust is based on the mutual confidence resulting from honest efforts to learn about and understand the capabilities each member brings to the team. Trust and confidence within a joint force are built the same way as within a Service tactical unit, by hard work, demonstrated competence, and planning and training together.

- **Successful teamwork requires delegation of authority** commensurate with responsibility. This is a necessary part of building and maintaining the trust based on competence that characterizes the successful team. Oversupervision disrupts teamwork. Delegation unleashes the best efforts and greatest initiative among all members of military teams. Delegation is especially important in joint warfare where Service expertise is an essential building block.

- **Successful teamwork also requires cooperation.** While this aspect of teamwork can be at tension with competition and both are central human characteristics, the nature of modern warfare puts a premium on cooperation within the team in order to compete successfully with the adversary. Higher echelons should never have to mandate cooperation. Cooperation requires team players and the willingness to share credit with all team members.

“Our military forces are one team — in the game to win regardless of who carries the ball. This is no time for ‘Fancy Dans’ who won’t hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals. Each player on this team — whether he shines in the spotlight of the backfield or eats dirt on the line — must be an all-American.”

GEN Omar N. Bradley, USA

CHAMBERLAIN HOLDS AT GETTYSBURG COURAGE AND COMPETENCE IN ACTION

On the second day of the battle of Gettysburg, Brigadier General Gouverneur K. Warren ordered Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain's 20th Maine Regiment to hold Little Round Top, a critical hill on the left end of the Union line. If Confederate forces took the hill, they could roll up the Union flank, precipitating a general collapse. Then General Robert E. Lee could move toward Washington as he liked, and the war might be lost. Chamberlain was ordered to hold that ground at all costs. The fate of the Union depended on the tactical performance of fewer than 400 men and officers.

Confederate forces attacked up the hill repeatedly. Chamberlain recognized that the more numerous Confederates were spreading to the unprotected left of his force. Under fire, he thinned his ranks to extend his line and bent back (refused) his left flank to prevent being attacked from behind. With each Confederate charge, his force shrank. As the day wore on, the Confederates were near exhaustion, but the 20th Maine was down to 200 men, all short on ammunition.

In a tactical inspiration, Colonel Chamberlain ordered bayonets to be fixed, and his entire regiment charged. The men on the refused flank spontaneously raced to straighten the line. Faced with what seemed like two regiments, the Confederates began a retreat, which soon turned into a rout. As the fight ended, the 20th took 400 prisoners. More important, they took from the Confederates all chance of turning the Union's flank.

Without Colonel Chamberlain's physical and moral courage — his willingness to make bold decisions in the face of uncertainty — backed by his tactical competence and the brave performance of his troops, the Union cause may have been lost.

SOURCE: *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection*
15 July 1997

When the members of the Armed Forces of the United States internalize and embody these values of joint warfare, their attitude about joint warfighting produces a synergy that multiplies the effects of their individual actions. A freely developed cooperative attitude is the key to the most productive integration of all force competencies and capabilities, and to the effective prosecution of the campaign.

d. **The Principles of War.** The principles of war provide the basis for the fundamentals of joint warfare and for the Services to develop their respective doctrine, tactics, techniques,

and procedures. The principles adopted by the Armed Forces of the United States are **objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity** (see Figure III-2). They are the bedrock of US military doctrine. JFCs should exercise judgment in applying these principles, recognizing that they are in some cases paired juxtapositions that address opposite aspects of warfare; mass and economy of force and security and surprise are examples. Appendix B, "Principles of War," contains a description of the principles of war and their applications to joint warfare.




Figure III-2. Principles of War

e. **The Principles of Military Operations Other Than War.** Joint doctrine adapted the classic principles of war to situations short of war that require the use of US military forces. The resulting principles for MOOTW are **objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy** (see Figure III-3). The definitions of these principles take into account the unique political considerations and nature of the operations, which differentiates the principles of MOOTW from the principles of war. The first three — objective, unity of effort, and




Figure III-3. Principles of MOOTW

security — closely parallel their combat counterparts. Restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy address the uniqueness of MOOTW and the political context in which they are conducted. Appendix C, “Principles of Military Operations Other Than War,” contains a description of the principles of MOOTW and their applications to joint operations.

f. **Fundamentals of Joint Warfare.** The fundamentals that guide joint operations of the Armed Forces of the United States (Figure III-4) are anchored in the application of the time-tested principles of war and the actual experience of American arms in warfare. These fundamentals do not supersede the principles of war. Rather, both must be considered together when conducting joint operations. As in all cultures, the application of general principles is best accomplished with due regard to the uniqueness — including cultural background — of the forces involved and the contemporary challenges they face in the envisioned battlespace. Therefore, the fundamentals of joint warfare that follow should be applied broadly, avoiding literal or dogmatic interpretations.



Figure III-4. Joint Warfare Fundamentals

- The fundamental of **unity of effort** demands that all undertakings be directed toward achievement of common aims. Unity of effort is first achieved at the national level when the President develops national security strategy (otherwise known as “national” or “grand strategy”). In support of this national security strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the JCS, advises the NCA concerning the application of military power. The resulting national military strategy provides strategic focus for US military activity. Strategy involves understanding the desired policy goals for a projected operation; that is, what should be the desired state of affairs when the conflict is terminated. The clear articulation of aims and objectives and the resulting strategic focus are fundamental prerequisites for unity of effort. National military strategy provides focus not only for war involving simultaneous major combat in multiple theaters (e.g., World War II), but also for regional crises, to which the Armed Forces respond rapidly, conduct operations, redeploy forces, and prepare for future operations. In such cases, a single combatant command is normally supported with the others in a supporting role. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the NCA as coordinator of the whole effort. Even here, however, where only one combatant command is supported, use of American military power directly or indirectly affects the other combatant commands and Federal agencies. Of the ten combatant commands of the Armed Forces of the United States in 1990, for instance, nine played major roles in the Gulf War, and the tenth (US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)) was affected. Six of these commands supported USSOUTHCOM in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. Cooperation among the combatant commanders and their supporting joint force and component commanders — within the framework of unity of effort directed and arranged at the national level — is crucial.
- **Concentration** of military power is a fundamental consideration. The Armed Forces of the United States should strive to operate with overwhelming force, based not only on the quantity of forces and materiel committed, but on the quality of their planning and skill of their employment. Properly trained and motivated forces, armed with superior technology and executing innovative, flexible, and well-coordinated plans, provide a decisive qualitative edge. Careful establishment of priorities aids concentration at the decisive point and time. Action to affect the enemy’s dispositions and readiness prior to battle and to prevent enemy reinforcement of the battle by land, sea, or air also promotes concentration. The purpose of these and related measures is to achieve an advantage and exploit that advantage decisively to win quickly, with as few casualties as possible.
- Seizing and maintaining the **initiative** is an American military tradition. Because the United States of America is not an aggressor nation, the Armed Forces may be initially forced to fight defensively for a time. However, all actions should be offensive in spirit, exploiting the full leverage of all available forces to confuse, demoralize, and defeat the enemy. Taking calculated risks to throw an opponent off balance or achieve major military advantage may be required. In any case, retaining the initiative relies on the ability of military people to think for themselves and execute orders intelligently — the ingenuity that has always been an American trademark.

JOINT CAMPAIGNING IN THE SOLOMONS, 1942-1943

The struggle for control of the Solomon Islands was a critical turning point in the war against Japan. These campaigns can best be appreciated as a sequence of interacting naval, land, and air operations. Operations began with the August 1942 amphibious landings at Guadalcanal, an audacious stroke to eliminate the threat to the Allied air and sea lines of communication with Australia posed by a potential Japanese air base on that island. During the next several months, under the tenacious leadership of General Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC, Marine and later Army units fought a series of desperate land battles to defend Henderson Field, the captured airfield on Guadalcanal. During the same period US Navy and Allied naval forces fought six grueling surface actions, finally thwarting the Japanese naval bombardment that had so punished the land and air forces ashore. From Henderson Field flew a unique air force: Marine, Navy, and Army Air Forces planes under a single air command, the “Cactus Air Force.” (CACTUS was the codeword for Guadalcanal.) In the words of Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, “If it had wings it flew; if it flew it fought....”

In February 1943 the Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal. The Allies undertook a sequence of actions to capture the remaining Solomons and isolate the huge Japanese base at Rabaul. Local air superiority enabled naval surface forces to shield amphibious landings from enemy surface ships and submarines; once ashore, land forces seized and built airfields; from these airfields air forces assisted in their defense and extended air cover to shield further naval advance; and then the cycle repeated. The Cactus Air Force grew into Air Solomons Command, a remarkably effective joint and combined air organization led in turn by Marine, Navy, and Army Air Forces commanders.

SOURCE: JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, 10 June 1995

- **Agility**, the ability to move quickly and easily, should characterize US military operations. Agility is relative; the aim is to be more agile than the foe. Agility is not primarily concerned with speed itself, but about timeliness: thinking, planning, communicating, and acting faster than the enemy can effectively react. Operating faster than and within the opponent’s decision cycle can expand options while denying options the opponent deems important. Agility has different perspectives based on the level of war (strategic, operational, or tactical). At each of these levels, operations on land and sea, undersea, and in the air and space must achieve a synchronized

timing and rapid tempo that overwhelm the opponent.

- **Strategic agility** requires properly focused logistic support including smoothly functioning defense transportation and global distribution systems, and a robust joint deployment system. Forward-deployed forces, pre-positioning, and the ability to deploy forces rapidly from the United States and redeploy them as necessary within and between theaters, also enhance strategic agility.

- The interaction of air, land, and sea forces contributes powerfully to

operational agility, as shown by the example of the Solomon Islands campaigns. The ability to integrate and exploit the various capabilities of a joint force can disorient an enemy who is weak in one or more of the dimensions of warfare, helping to create a mismatch between what the foe anticipates and what actually occurs. This mismatch can lead to shock, panic, and demoralization, especially in the minds of the enemy leadership.

- When militarily advantageous, operations should be **extended** to the fullest breadth and depth feasible given political, force, and logistic constraints. Requiring the enemy to disperse forces over a broad area can render those forces ineffective and complicate enemy planning. At the operational level, joint air, land, sea, special operations, and space forces can enable operations to be extended throughout a theater, denying sanctuary to the enemy. At the strategic level, for a country like the United States with global responsibilities and worldwide military capabilities, the use of armed force anywhere can have implications throughout the military

establishment. Commanders not immediately affected may nonetheless play critically important support roles, while preparing their forces for the possibility of more direct involvement should the scope or site of conflict change or expand.

- **Maintaining freedom of action** is vital. There are many components to securing the freedom to act. Effective diplomatic, economic, military, and informational instruments of power are needed to provide the freedom to act at the national level. Adequate robust logistic support is essential, as is maintaining the security of plans and gaining the fullest possible surprise. Having a force structure that provides insurance against unanticipated developments or the underestimation of enemy strengths is important as well.
 - Several aspects of modern warfare tend to restrict freedom of action. Sophisticated information technology and the nature of modern news reporting, for instance, make the tasks of ensuring operations security and surprise more difficult. But as Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, and



B-17 Flying Fortress making low-level attack on Japanese installations during the Solomons campaign, October 1942.

DESERT STORM showed, tight operations and information security — even at the expense of some staff efficiency — can work to achieve effective surprise. Joint forces should understand that these sorts of very demanding security precautions are a likely part of future operations and should accommodate stringent operations security in exercises and training in order to practice staff efficiency and public affairs activities under realistic conditions.

•• The role of deception in securing freedom of action should never be underestimated. Indeed, military thinkers since Sun Tzu have stressed the central nature of deception in successful warfare. Deception can provide a highly leveraged means to confuse US enemies and cause them to miscalculate friendly intentions, deploy their forces poorly, and mistakenly estimate friendly strengths and weaknesses, while helping to preserve friendly freedom of action. Deception at the joint force level requires clear themes around which all components can focus their efforts.

“The essence of flexibility is in the mind of the commander; the substance of flexibility is in logistics.”

RADM Henry Eccles, USN

- Sustaining operations at the strategic and operational levels underwrites agility, extension of operations, and freedom of action. Strategic and theater logistics and deployment concepts are integral to combat success. These concepts are driven by the plans and orders of JFCs and supported by the Services, by other supporting commands, and often by support from allies and friends. Logistic standardization (to include deployment and redeployment procedures and

equipment interoperability where practical) also enhances **sustainment** of joint force operations.

- Because modern warfare is inherently complex, plans and operations should be kept as simple as possible. **Clarity** of expression should predominate, using common terms and procedures. This is particularly important when operating with allies or improvised coalitions. Making sure that all speak the same language and keeping that language clear and concise are essential.

“Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”

Sun Tzu

• **Knowledge**

•• **Knowledge of self** is required for effective joint operations. The first priority is to have a full and frank appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of all friendly forces. JFCs must also have a clear appreciation of friendly centers of gravity which are their key sources of strength, so that operations may assure their protection from adversary attack. In joint matters, reliance is first upon component commanders and staffs as the true experts on their forces. Service forces assigned to a joint force provide an array of combat power from which the JFC chooses. Component commanders best know the unique capabilities that their forces bring to combat and how those capabilities can help attain the JFC’s objectives. Component commanders should also know how these capabilities mesh with the forces of the other components. They can then assist JFCs, other component commanders, and their staffs to integrate the whole.

- The requirement to plan and conduct joint operations demands expanded intellectual horizons and broadened professional knowledge. Leaders who aspire to joint command must not only have mastered the essentials of their own Service capabilities, but also must understand the fundamentals of combat power represented by the other Services. Beyond that, they must have a clear sense of how these capabilities are integrated for the conduct of joint and multinational operations. This individual professional growth, reinforced by military education and varied Service and joint assignments, leads to a refined capability to command joint forces in peace and war.

- **Knowledge of the enemy** is a preeminent but difficult responsibility. Traditionally, emphasis has been on understanding enemy capabilities; but knowledge of enemy intentions can be equally or even more important, to the extent that light may be shed on enemy plans, permitting timely and effective action to blunt them. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuous process that enables the commander to understand the total

battlespace environment. Key to this process is understanding the adversary's critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, limitations, COGs, and potential COAs. The Armed Forces of the United States and the national intelligence community have harnessed the capability of modern technology to provide intelligence to the fighting forces. The challenge for JFCs normally is not to amass more data but to extract and organize the knowledge most useful for overcoming the enemy. A key concept that integrates intelligence and operations is COGs, a term first applied in the military context by Clausewitz to describe "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends." Joint doctrine defines centers of gravity as: "Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight."

- Finding and attacking enemy COGs is a singularly important concept. Rather than attack peripheral enemy vulnerabilities, attacking COGs means concentrating against capabilities whose destruction or overthrow will yield



Finding and attacking enemy centers of gravity is a singularly important concept.

success. Though providing an essential focus for all efforts, attacking COGs is often not easy because they are an adversary's sources of strength. Progressively defeating enemy measures undertaken to defend COGs may be required to expose those centers to attack, both at the strategic and operational levels. Actions to extend offensive efforts throughout the theater, including deep penetrations of enemy territory, can increase the vulnerability of enemy COGs.

•• This concept of COGs helps JFCs focus their intelligence requirements. Intelligence should anticipate the needs of the commander and be timely, objective, usable, complete, accurate, relevant, and available to all who need it. It should aid the identification of COGs and suggest how they might most effectively be dealt with. Beyond that, however, intelligence should provide the capability to verify which desired military effects have or have not been achieved and generally support the commander's situational awareness in what will often be a dynamic, fast-moving, and confusing (fog of war) situation.

•• **Knowing oneself and the enemy allows employment of friendly strength against the enemy's key vulnerabilities and avoids exposing friendly vulnerabilities to the enemy strengths.** This fundamental and familiar precept is designed to preserve the competitive advantage for one's own forces. It suggests an indirect approach — avoiding head-on attacks when enveloping movements, for example, will better capitalize on one's strengths and enemy vulnerabilities. The diversity and flexibility of joint forces are particularly well suited to provide the commander

with an expanded range of operational or tactical options. The side with the most effective integration of operations on land and sea, undersea, and in the air and space is best situated to exploit the diversity of approaches that a joint force provides.

g. **Range of Military Operations.** The United States employs military forces in a variety of ways based on the characteristics of the particular situation in the context of the overall international security environment. The range of military operations encompasses war and operations other than war (Figure III-5). In many circumstances, a mix of these types of operations may be underway worldwide or even in a particular theater. The distinctions that follow assist commanders in understanding the characteristics of each and provide guidance for associated military actions.

- **War** in this context refers to large-scale, sustained combat operations. When necessary to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the United States may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations in conjunction with other instruments of national power, placing the United States in a wartime state. When US military forces are committed to combat, their purpose is to fight and win, concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners.
- **Military operations other than war** focus on deterring war and promoting peace. These operations include two general types, one in which force is used and one in which it is not used. During peacetime, combatant commanders develop plans to focus their command's efforts at engaging allies and other friendly countries in cooperative activity to promote peace, deter war, and promote US objectives. These plans must include

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS			
	MILITARY OPERATIONS	GENERAL US GOALS	REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	Large-scale Combat Operations: Attack / Defend / Blockade
	NONCOMBAT	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement Counterterrorism Show of Force/Raid/Strike Peacekeeping/Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Nation Assistance
Military Operations Other Than War		Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities	Freedom of Navigation Counterdrug Humanitarian Assistance Protection of Shipping US Civil Support

Figure III-5. Range of Military Operations

provisions for both types of operations other than war.

- In spite of US efforts to promote peace, conditions within a country or region may result in armed conflict. When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation and US interests are at risk, military force may be required. Such a use of force would serve to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, and terminate the situation on terms favorable to the United States. The general goals of US military operations during such periods are to support US objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace. These operations involve a greater risk that US forces could become involved in combat rather than operations conducted to promote peace. These military operations other than war

include but are not limited to peace operations, strikes, raids, shows of force, combatting terrorism, evacuation of noncombatants, and support to insurgency.

- The second category of military operations other than war does not involve use or threat of force, but rather employs military forces in peacetime to continue to promote peace and alleviate human suffering. This assists in keeping the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains US influence in foreign lands. These operations include, but are not limited to, disaster relief, nation assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance, support to counterdrug activities, assistance to civil authorities, and support to diplomatic peace activities. These operations do not involve combat, but military forces must always be prepared to protect themselves and to adapt to a changing situation.



A complex set of military operations may be underway at any one time across and within theaters.

h. Integration with Other Instruments of National Power

- When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a national-level effort involving all instruments of national power. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a number of Federal departments and agencies. In certain operations, agencies of states, localities, or foreign countries may also be involved. The President establishes guidelines for civil-military integration and normally disseminates decisions and monitors execution through the NSC.
- Complex operations, such as peace operations, may require a high order of civil-military integration. Presidential directives (such as Presidential Decision Directive 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*) guide participation by all US civilian and military agencies in such operations. Military leaders must work with the other members of the national security team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent

ways to promote unity of effort. Operations of agencies representing the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power are not under command of the Armed Forces of the United States or of any specific combatant commander. In domestic US situations, a civil agency such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assumes overall control of interagency operations including military elements. Abroad, the US ambassador and the country team may be in control in operations other than war not involving the use of force.

- Across the range of military operations, military leaders play key roles in cooperation with civilian governmental and private agencies. These include agencies of US federal, state, and local governments; international organizations such as the United Nations; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); private voluntary organizations (PVOs); and various governmental and nongovernmental agencies of host nations and multinational partners. Military commanders have responsibility

for the command and control of their forces and are accountable for their actions. They also are responsible for timely and complete advice and recommendations to the leaders of nonmilitary organizations with whom they are operating in order to ensure clear understanding of military capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military action.

5. Conclusion

At any one time, joint forces may be involved in a complex set of military operations across and within theaters to

accomplish missions. For example, a combat operation to contain a major conflict in one part of the world or one part of a theater may be taking place simultaneously with a number of supporting and independent operations other than war to reinforce peace, provide foreign humanitarian assistance, and assist civil authorities. The purpose of employing military forces and military force — defending and advancing US interests — may call for any number of combinations of types of operations. The Armed Forces of the United States must be prepared to fulfill both their fundamental purpose of winning the Nation's wars as well as providing unconditional service in support of broad national objectives.

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CHAPTER IV

THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER

“Allied effectiveness in World War II established for all time the feasibility of developing and employing joint control machinery that can meet the sternest tests of war. The key to the matter is a readiness, on highest levels, to adjust all nationalistic differences that affect the strategic employment of combined resources, and, in the war theater, to designate a single commander who is supported to the limit. With these two things done, success rests in the vision, the leadership, the skill, and the judgment of the professionals making up command and staff groups; if these two things are not done, only failure can result.”

GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower, USA

This chapter completes the description of the relationship of fundamental national security ends to military means. Chapter I, “Fundamental Concepts,” and Chapter II, “The Strategic Security Environment,” outlined the primacy of national security interests, the development of national security policy and strategy to protect and advance those interests, and the nature of the challenges to those interests in the international security environment. Chapter III, “United States Military Power,” explained the purpose and nature of the Armed Forces of the United States and their unique responsibilities in American society, and fundamental principles that guide their employment. The paragraphs that follow describe the use of force and employment of forces as means to achieve US strategic ends, with national military strategy providing the link between the two.

1. Considerations for the Use of Military Force

a. When the United States resorts to the use of force, it adheres to its fundamental societal values and moral precepts. The use of military force is the most important military decision that the United States can make. It is a civilian decision, based on sound military advice, ultimately made by the elected political leaders on behalf of the American people. There are no unbending rules to

handling the countless crises that confront the United States. Each must be weighed based on its own merit and in its own context. However, there are clear parameters and considerations, based on law, values, and experience, which inform decisions about managing crises and the use of force. Among these are the legality, propriety, and likelihood of success of the use of force; the commitment to decisive yet proportional action; the integration of the other instruments of national power; and accountability to the American people. In all cases, the use of force, unless linked to discernible vital, important, or other national interests, is not sustainable.

- **Vital interests** are those that directly impact the survival and vitality of the Republic and its way of life. Such issues as the safety of American citizens at home and abroad, the security of US territory or that of US allies, and protection of US economic well-being are examples. When force is used in combat for defending these interests, it must be both overwhelming and decisive.
- The category of **important national interests** includes those short of national survival that affect national well-being and the character of the world in which Americans live. In these situations where there is a threat to important interests, the

use of military force is an option if the costs and risks associated with their use are commensurate with the threatened interest. In these situations, use of force must be selective, depending on the circumstances at hand. Nevertheless, the forces employed in pursuit of important national interests must be of the size, capabilities, training, and readiness to accomplish the mission. When combat is possible, the force employed must be both overwhelming and decisive.

- The cases involving **other interests, including humanitarian** concerns, frequently require the use of military organizational capabilities and resources rather than their combat power and use of force. While military forces are not generally the best tools to solve humanitarian crises, under certain circumstances the appropriate use of the Armed Forces of the United States can bring about a solution to the problem at hand. Such efforts should be limited in duration. They should also have a clearly defined end state, entail minimal risk to

the Armed Forces, and be designed to give the affected country or region the opportunity to restore its own basic services. And, at the same time, these efforts should not jeopardize the ability of the Armed Forces to respond to direct threats to vital and important national security interests in other regions of the world.

- b. When the NCA consider the use of force, military advice on the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States seeks to clearly define the contemplated mission, and ensure understanding of the means needed to accomplish it and the campaign plan that establishes the path to success. The military advice should address these and a number of other important considerations summarized in Figure IV-1. Among them are mission measures of success and milestones, alternative COAs, and termination conditions and exit strategy. These considerations guide civil-military interactions and support the NCA's decision making process. For example, in the case of a threat to vital national interests, although the support of multinational

CONSIDERATIONS FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

- **Advances National Interests**
- **Clearly Defined and Achievable Mission**
- **End State, Termination Conditions, and Exit Strategy Clear**
- **Decisive Means Available**
- **Campaign Plan Showing Path to Success**
- **Milestones to Measure Success**
- **Alternate Courses of Action if Military Unsuccessful**
- **National and International Agencies Ready for Their Roles**
- **Support of Allies, Friends, International Institutions**
- **Support of American People**

Figure IV-1. Considerations for Use of Military Force

partners is clearly desired, the United States is prepared to act alone. Sustaining involvement in military operations, regardless of the level of national interest, ultimately requires support of the American people. To ensure their support, military involvement must clearly advance national interests. If it does, then the use of force and employment of forces must remain very clear in purpose and very resolute in action.

2. National Military Strategy

The US NMS guides the Armed Forces in employing their resources in the most effective manner to achieve national security and defense objectives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the combatant commanders, periodically publishes the NMS to implement the current US national security strategy. The NMS expresses the relationships between key US military objectives worldwide and the capabilities available to the Armed Forces of the United States in order to achieve the objectives. The campaigns that combatant commanders develop to support national strategic objectives are heavily influenced by the NMS.

Joint doctrine includes fundamental principles concerning how best to employ military power to achieve strategic ends. Since joint doctrine provides insights and wisdom gained from the collective experience with warfare, it fundamentally shapes the way the Armed Forces think about and train for war. Joint doctrine, therefore, influences professional military participation in the development of military strategy and provides authoritative guidance for its implementation.

a. **Influencing the International Security Environment.** Throughout the history of the Republic, the Armed Forces of the United States have developed capabilities, maintained readiness postures, and operated abroad as an arm of the Nation to influence international

events. Guided by inherently defensive national policies, the Armed Forces of the United States have capabilities to influence the international environment in ways that advance and defend US interests and support key US objectives abroad.

- **Promoting Stability.** The United States internationally promotes democracy, economic well-being, and peaceful change. Where these policies enjoy support, the United States actively seeks to promote regional stability to deter potential aggressors and to advance US interests and objectives. The Armed Forces of the United States typically operate in conjunction with allies and other friendly states to demonstrate the military capability to defeat aggression and thereby support the processes of peaceful progress. Military activities that promote stability include presence in the region, assistance in the improvement of indigenous military capabilities, and peacetime engagement activities. Peacetime engagement activities which promote stability include military-to-military contacts, multinational exercises which improve readiness and interoperability, education and training programs, foreign humanitarian assistance, security assistance, and arms control initiatives.
- **Preventing or Reducing Conflicts and Threats.** Military forces can provide a degree of security and deter or contain violence in a region so that democratic processes can address the root causes of societal dysfunctions and conflict. The Armed Forces may be directed to support indigenous forces and civil authorities, improve their capabilities, and provide essential assistance with unique US military operational and logistic capabilities. The United States may also participate in regional arms control activities (such as inspections and

monitoring) that may call for US military expertise.

- **Peacetime Deterrence.** Successful deterrence requires a conclusion by the potential adversary that aggressive action will not succeed, and that the certain consequences of aggression outweigh any potential benefit. Military forces contribute significantly to deterrence by presenting visible evidence of their ability to defeat aggression, including the ability to act globally, rapidly, and decisively in conjunction with indigenous military forces. In regions of particular concern to the United States, continuous US military engagement with regional forces, frequent exercises and exchanges, visible presence, and pre-positioned equipment and supplies are means that can significantly contribute to peacetime deterrence.
- **Action Across the Range of Military Operations.** The tumultuous international security environment and global diffusion of vital and important US interests demand that the Armed Forces of the United States maintain ready capabilities to act across the range of military operations. In those situations where efforts to promote stability and reduce conflict have been unsuccessful, or where efforts to deter aggression have failed, US ability to respond with ready forces is critical. While the specific manifestations of threats, crises, and conflicts may vary from time to time, the military capabilities upon which the United States must rely take years to develop and to achieve operational capability. A credible US force-in-being — capable of action across the range of military operations — is the only reliable guarantor of US vital interests. Moreover, the simultaneous outbreak of crises and conflicts in regions of US interest dictate that US military forces be

capable of simultaneous operations in a number of different theaters. The challenge to senior military leaders in planning for the application of military power is to assess the risks associated with simultaneous engagements and provide relevant advice and recommendations to the NCA. In addition, the combatant commanders should train their forces and include appropriate branches and sequels in their campaign and other operation plans in order to adapt to unanticipated circumstances as the threats to US interests change.

- **Deterring Aggression and Coercion in Crises.** In crisis situations, potential adversaries may miscalculate US capabilities and resolve. Therefore, a vital element in containing a crisis and deterring aggression is to communicate clearly US commitment, resolve, and intentions. Military options to emphasize resolve and bolster deterrence that may be considered include reinforcement of regional forces, demonstrations of military capabilities, rigorous and visible enforcement of pre-existing sanctions, and conduct of limited strikes. Senior military leaders, particularly the responsible combatant commander, present their advice and recommendations to the NCA for specific actions to reinforce deterrence during crises.
- **Fighting and Winning Major Wars.** Defense of US interests worldwide entails the unambiguous ability of the Armed Forces of the United States to fight and win in large-scale, sustained combat operations abroad. The application of US military power in major wars entails careful assessments of what other military activities may be possible while war is being prosecuted. The United States may simultaneously face aggression in multiple theaters. The

IMPORTANCE OF PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

Nevertheless, Operation ALLIED FORCE could not have been conducted without the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alliance and without the infrastructure, transit and basing access, host-nation force contributions, and most importantly, political and diplomatic support provided by the allies and other members of the coalition. These immense contributions from our allies and partners — particularly those nations near the theater of conflict such as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and others — were in large part a dividend of sustained US and NATO engagement with those nations over the last few years. This engagement — including vigorous participation in Partnership for Peace activities — helped to stabilize institutions in these nations so they were better able to withstand the tremendous burden inflicted upon them by the humanitarian crisis and the conduct of the operation itself.

**SOURCE: “Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After-Action Report,”
DOD Report to Congress, 31 January 2000**

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the combatant commanders, has key responsibilities in this regard. The Chairman must provide to the NCA periodic assessments of the US ability to support the national security and military strategies with the forces available. These assessments include the possibility of simultaneous operations. The corresponding advice and recommendations focus on the military options available to advance and defend US interests.

- **Conducting Multiple, Concurrent Small-Scale Contingency Operations.** Simultaneous occurrence of challenges and threats to US interests worldwide often requires concurrent commitment of US forces to a variety of relatively small-scale contingency operations. The key challenge to US military capabilities under these circumstances may be the limitations on logistic support and limited numbers of units with scarce or unique capabilities that are in high demand. The Armed Forces of the United States must maintain the capability to support a number of concurrent operations in the

United States and abroad. Senior military leaders are responsible for timely and complete advice and recommendations to the NCA concerning the negative impact on readiness for major war that may result from commitment to multiple, concurrent small-scale contingency operations.

- **Use of Flexible Deterrent Options.** To deter or defeat aggression and other challenges to its interests, the United States must be able to employ variable combinations of the instruments of national power. Therefore, the United States maintains capabilities and plans to exercise tailored mixes of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments to reinforce deterrence and cope with the outbreak of conflict. These flexible deterrent options call for detailed peacetime planning by the combatant command and supporting agencies involved. Many of these options are under control of nonmilitary agencies. Senior military leaders are responsible for providing advice and recommendations on the military aspects of flexible deterrent options to the NCA. Combatant commanders are responsible for



Availability of low density, high demand units is a key challenge to conducting concurrent contingency operations.

preparing and employing trained, ready, and exercised force elements when the options are put into action.

b. Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future. The Armed Forces of the United States are living, learning institutions. While responsible for delivering US military power in the present, they also are responsible for learning from the past and preparing for the future. The role of senior military leaders in shaping the future is twofold. The first aspect is to provide advice and recommendations to the NCA, the Congress, and other responsible civil authorities on projected requirements for future military capabilities. This will assist the civilian leaders in providing needed policy and resource guidance and decisions. The second aspect is to establish a framework for developing future joint and Service doctrine, concepts, and assessments and from these to develop future forces.

3. Enduring Concepts

The ability to commit US military power depends on the posture and readiness of the forces. The Armed Forces of the United States apply a set of enduring concepts for conducting key types of military operations. These concepts

provide guidelines to define and establish the posture needed to accomplish contemporary missions. In view of the current international security environment, these concepts include strategic agility, overseas presence, power projection, and decisive force.

a. Strategic Agility. Strategic agility is the ability to adapt, conceptually and physically, to changes in the international security environment in order to prevent an adversary from successfully exploiting surprise and to ensure the protection of US interests at risk. This requires that the Armed Forces be able to act effectively more rapidly than the adversary, even in the absence of advance warning. Military leaders and planners apply this concept to ensure the ability of joint forces to plan and operate in unanticipated contingencies in accordance with the principles of war or operations other than war as well as the fundamentals of joint warfare.

b. Overseas Presence. Overseas presence includes permanently stationed and rotationally or temporarily deployed forces forward in regions of particular importance for advancing and defending US interests. Overseas forces maintain visible capabilities that support deterrence, are able to operate

across the range of military operations should deterrence fail in their regions of deployment, and are able to project power to other regions when necessary. The forward-positioning of these forces helps shape the security environment by promoting regional stability, giving substance to US security commitments, helping to prevent power vacuums, contributing to deterrence, and ensuring continuing access to the regions where US national interests are most concentrated. Forces deployed overseas should be configured to provide combatant commanders with a flexible array of immediately available options for prompt response to aggression and unanticipated military operations other than war. In considering overall US defense requirements, senior military leaders and planners develop options for the proportion of the force to commit to overseas presence, assessments of the risks associated with the options, and provide advice and recommendations for decision to the NCA.

c. **Power Projection.** The Armed Forces of the United States provide the military dimension of US national power projection and support, as appropriate, the projection of the other instruments of national power. **Power projection** is the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its instruments of national power — diplomatic, economic, informational, or military — to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. **Force projection** is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the continental United States (CONUS) or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment to CONUS or home theater. Given the absence of military threats on US borders, power projection is a concept that defines the utility of American military power. Due to the uncertainties in the

international security environment, US forces must be prepared for deployment, and in some cases employment, from the United States to any theater, as well as from one theater to another. Similarly, forces able to project their effects directly to the desired area of engagement without deployment must be prepared for such contingencies as an inherent element of US power projection. The challenge to senior military leaders is to assess and provide recommendations to the NCA on the overseas presence and power projection capabilities to maintain worldwide.

d. **Decisive Force.** The Armed Forces of the United States employ decisive force — force powerful enough to unequivocally and rapidly defeat an opponent — to achieve the military objectives assigned. Senior military leaders must understand the likely demands of an operation and provide advice and recommendations to the NCA on the degree of confidence and risk they associate with the contemplated force.

"We use force as a last resort . . . when the decision is made to use force, then we need to go in with overwhelming force, quite frankly, extraordinary violence that the speed of it, the lethality of it . . . the weight of it has to make an incredible impression on the adversary, to such a degree that he is stunned and shocked . . . you take the fight to the enemy. You go after the head of the snake, put a dagger in the heart of the adversary, and you bring to bear all the force that you have at your command."

Lt Gen Mike Short, USAF

e. **Other Concepts**

- **Forcible Entry.** Adversary actions and capabilities may require a forcible entry into the theater of operations, with forces prepared to fight immediately upon arrival. Forcible entry entails seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. While normally complex and

risky, forcible entry is a required capability for the Armed Forces of the United States. Joint training, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, assist combatant commanders to prepare for and execute forcible entry operations while containing risks and providing the foundation for success.

- **Timeliness** is a key challenge to military leaders and planners. While US capabilities permit rapid arrival of forces in an objective area, it may take time to assemble and commit a force sufficient to achieve decisive results. Arriving first with the most capability clearly remains the objective. The art in planning military operations is to sequence the concentration in conjunction with application of other instruments of national power. US military campaigns should be designed to achieve their objectives in the most rapid, effective manner possible and at the lowest cost feasible in terms of loss of life and unwanted destruction.

“Time is the essence in war, and while a defeat may be balanced by a battle won, days and hours — even minutes — frittered away, can never be regained.”

BGen Samuel B. Griffith, II, USMC

- While not unique to American culture, preserving human life is among its highest imperatives. However, casualties are inevitable in most violent applications of military power. The guiding principle for US military operations is to assure mission accomplishment while making every effort to **ensure the combat capability** and **survival** of the force.

4. Enduring Enablers

The following aspects of the United States and its military forces are of particular

importance in enabling the application of the enduring concepts (Figure IV-2).

a. **People.** People are the most important enabler of US military forces and are the key to their success in peace and war. While technology may assist Service men and women, it is their innate courage, intellect, motivation, skill, tenacity, and self-sacrifice that makes the difference and assures victory. In developing and fielding forces, the Armed Forces of the United States keep foremost the responsibility to provide the best leadership, training, and equipment; to attend to the welfare of Service members and families; and to treat all individuals with dignity and respect.

b. **Technology.** The US commitment to providing the best advanced technology to the Armed Forces of the United States is an important aspect of American military power. While technology alone cannot assure success in battle, when adapted to empower the individual and integrated with doctrine, training, and leader development, the result can produce dominant capabilities against an adversary. A discussion of harnessing technology for the future is in Chapter VIII, “Addressing the Future.”

c. **Information Superiority.** The United States has the human and technological capability to establish and maintain information superiority. This entails a variety of measures to provide complete, timely and secure information to friendly users while denying vital information to the adversary. The objective of information superiority is to make the most effective use of friendly forces by assuring a timely, reliable, and secure continuous flow of accurate key information about the ongoing situation, and interfering with the opponent’s information to the extent that opposition becomes ineffective or nonexistent. Of particular importance is the timely availability, integrity, and confidentiality of intelligence, and the




Figure IV-2. Enduring Concepts and Enablers

integration of intelligence functions with all other functions across the range of military operations. Information superiority cannot be automatically assumed. Military leaders and planners must continuously plan, execute, assess, and adjust the means available to achieve and maintain information superiority.

d. **Global Command and Control.** The United States maintains global command and control systems and processes to support the range of military operations in peace, crisis, and conflict. These systems and processes enable the NCA and the Armed Forces to establish and maintain unity of command and unity of effort. The military requirements for command and control in support of US interests worldwide demand a robust global system of communications and computers to facilitate transmissions of data, decisions, and orders. Military planners and specialized units must plan for security and redundancy in order to ensure effective global command and control.

e. **Air, Land, Sea, and Space Control.** Maintaining US military freedom of action and the ability to project power globally demand assured access to air, land, sea, and space lines of communications at a time and place of US choice. Therefore, within the limits allowed by law and national policy, the Armed Forces of the United States must be able to gain and maintain at minimum superiority and, if feasible, dominance in these mediums to assure the effectiveness of US military power.

f. **Strategic Mobility.** The ability to deploy, sustain, and redeploy US military forces with their associated equipment worldwide is essential to the effective execution of US national security and military strategies. The Armed Forces must maintain the mix of military and immediately available civilian contract capabilities to meet the most challenging scenarios across the range of military operations.



**The Medal of Honor is Awarded to
Lieutenant Commander James Jonas Madison, United States Navy**

Lieutenant Commander Madison was commanding officer of the U.S.S. Ticonderoga, when, on 4 October 1918, that vessel was attacked by an enemy submarine and was sunk after a prolonged and gallant resistance. The submarine opened fire at a range of 500 yards, the first shots taking effect on the bridge and forecastle, 1 of the 2 forward guns of the Ticonderoga being disabled by the second shot. The fire was returned and the fight continued for nearly 2 hours. Commander Madison was severely wounded early in the fight, but caused himself to be placed in a chair on the bridge and continued to direct the fire and to maneuver the ship. When the order was finally given to abandon the sinking ship, he became unconscious from loss of blood, but was lowered into a lifeboat and was saved, with 31 others, out of a total number of 236 on board.

g. Sustainment. Logistic support of military forces in the international security environment places a special burden on the Armed Forces of the United States. The uncertainties and the likelihood of sudden unforeseen challenges to US vital and important interests demand that logistic support and the underlying civilian industrial base be immediately available to initiate, prosecute, and terminate operations without a prolonged period of mobilization and build-up. Logistic considerations are integral elements of military planning for all types of operations from the development of requirements, options, and concepts through the conclusion of operations.

h. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. A robust and secure system of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that combines all sources — US military, nonmilitary intelligence agencies, commercial systems, and systems of allies and other friendly countries — is essential. The entire system and supporting networks and processes should be integrated with global command and control systems, synchronized with current and planned military operations, facilitate development and dissemination of a common intelligence picture, and contribute to assuring US information superiority.

i. Assured Access to the Battlespace. Overseas presence and power projection are possible only if US military forces have assured access to the battlespace in which they operate and to the shore-based infrastructure from which they operate. Access may be secured by the capabilities of the land, air, maritime, special operation, and space forces to be employed (including forcible entry) from the United States or other locations, or from international waters and airspace. Access may also be secured by agreements reached by the United States with other countries involved. This places a requirement on the civilian and military agencies of the USG to have prudent peacetime agreements with other states around the world to facilitate US entry, prosecution, and conclusion of operations. In the absence of permanently-stationed overseas forces, rotationally or temporarily deployed forces help maintain US access to regions of national interest by deterring potential adversaries, reassuring friends and allies of continuing US commitment to regional security and stability, and enabling the flow of follow-on forces in the event of crisis. Their peacetime engagement operations may be adapted to spearhead access for contingency operations. Their military-to-military contacts may provide essential host nation access. Often the initiative rests with the diplomatic

instrument, the Secretary of State, and US ambassadors and their country teams abroad. Military leaders have the responsibility to clearly communicate their requirements for access and to identify alternatives when a particular locale becomes unavailable. Despite all efforts, access may be problematical, necessitating that the Armed Forces of the United States maintain a forcible entry capability.

j. **National Will.** National will is an expression of the support and determination of the American people for a particular outcome or policy. National public cohesion for objectives in war and other military operations are visible to friend and foe and can influence the outcome of the enterprise. While in the US constitutional system the President, appointed leaders, and Congressional members bear the responsibility for explaining the purpose and obtaining the support from the public for any particular COA including military action, senior military leaders have important and unique supporting responsibilities. Principal among these responsibilities is maintaining a trained and ready force in whose competence the American people can be confident. Supporting military responsibilities include timely and accurate dissemination of information to the public about ongoing operations, and support of military men and women and their families during periods of operational stress.

k. **Force Protection.** It is essential for the Armed Forces to provide the best feasible

protection for US forces, people, families, and facilities worldwide from a variety of predictable and inherently unforeseeable threats. Protection should include military capabilities and functions such as information, intelligence, logistics and others that are essential for mission accomplishment. These threats include the extension of a conflict beyond its original region to US citizens, bases, facilities, and interests, even into US territory. Of particular concern is the capability of clandestine military operations and terrorist organizations to attack vulnerable, populated areas and critical infrastructures with a variety of lethal means. The threat includes employment of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) and radiological weapons and other highly destructive conventional explosives and highly toxic chemicals and materials against unprotected people and facilities. Military considerations for force protection therefore include not only military elements in a region of conflict, but also military and civilian potential targets of high value to the United States wherever they may be, including US territory. While not a stand-alone military mission, force protection is an essential consideration for peacetime readiness and military activities across the range of military operations.

“Even in friendly territory a fortified camp should be set up; a general should never have to say: ‘I did not expect it.’”

**Emperor Maurice
The Strategikon, 600 A.D.**

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CHAPTER V

FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

“There is still a tendency in each separate unit . . . to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire . . . To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support each other. Team play wins.”

GEN George S. Patton, Jr., USA

The campaign is the central organizing instrument for joint warfare. The JFC uses it to arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions into a series of related major operations, focused on accomplishing strategic and operational objectives. The campaign is planned and executed by applying operational art. To establish the context for campaign planning in combatant commands, unified command and theater strategies establish the relationships between national security and military objectives and the forces and other resources available to the command. The use of unified action and clear command relationships assist combatant and subordinate commanders in employing forces across the range of military operations.

1. Elements of Joint Operational Art

The joint operational art encompasses the translation of strategy into operational design for the joint employment of forces at all levels of war. It integrates all force capabilities into a unified whole focused on the command’s major objectives. It guides the development, organization, integration, and execution of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. The following discussion summarizes the elements of joint operational art, which are explained in more detail in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (see Figure V-1).

a. An important challenge in applying the operational art is to achieve the greatest effect

from the combination of all relevant and available force capabilities — **synergy**. The synergy that results from the integration and synchronization of the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces over time and space assists the JFC to assail important adversary vulnerabilities while presenting no friendly seams or vulnerabilities for the adversary to exploit. The degree of synergy achieved depends in large part on the friendly forces’ shared understanding of friendly and adversary situations — including friendly commander’s intent and adversary intentions — and on being able to exploit that situational awareness to achieve leverage and advantage over the adversary.

“We plan because synergy does not happen by itself. Synchronization does not happen by accident. For synchronization, coordination, [and] integration to take place, planning is required.”

VADM Vern Clark, USN

b. Another fundamental aim in applying the operational art is to bring the appropriate elements of the force to bear **simultaneously** against the opponent’s entire structure to the **depth** of the theater in order to multiply the combined effects and increase synergy. When the friendly forces have an accurate and shared awareness of the situation, understand the opponent, and operate more rapidly than the opponent can react, they can **anticipate** events, achieve surprise, and seize opportunities.




Figure V-1. Elements of Operational Art

c. To assure freedom of action and maintain the initiative, the JFC should strive to maintain **balance** in the force's posture (forces committed and in reserve, decisively engaged and able to accept changes in mission, in fixed positions and able to move and maneuver at will, etc.). Balance will permit rapidly adapting to a changing situation. This will allow the JFC to tailor the force mix and focus its capabilities, exploit adversary vulnerabilities, and adapt the nature and timing of its operations to most effectively accomplish its mission. JFCs designate priority efforts and establish appropriate command relationships, and control the timing and tempo of operations to assist in maintaining balance. These efforts seek to preserve the responsiveness of the total joint force and its components' capabilities, which is central to operational art. The JFC seeks to maintain friendly force balance while aggressively seeking to disrupt the adversary's balance by striking with powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions.

d. An appropriate mix of force capabilities also contributes to achieving **leverage** against the opponent. Attaining this advantage is the centerpiece of the operational art. JFCs achieve leverage by properly integrating and employing their forces to gain, maintain, and exploit advantages in combat power across all its dimensions, employing to the maximum all other elements of the operational art.

- The JFC obtains leverage by establishing appropriate command relationships between components and establishing a focus of effort, or main effort, for each phase of an operation. This allows the JFC to maintain unity of effort and focus and integrate each component's unique capabilities while arranging symmetric and asymmetric actions to take advantage of friendly strengths against important enemy vulnerabilities.

“The Americans, with minimum losses, attacked and seized a relatively weak area, constructed airfields, and then proceeded to cut the supply lines to troops in that area. The Japanese army preferred direct assault, after German fashion, but the Americans flowed into our weaker points and submerged us, just as water seeks the weakest entry to sink a ship. We respected this type of strategy for its brilliance because it gained the most while losing the least.”

**Lieutenant Colonel Matsuichi Iino,
Japanese Eighth Area Army, WW II**

- The JFC also shapes the nature of interactions with the adversary to achieve leverage. Engagements with the enemy may be thought of as “symmetric” if friendly and enemy forces have similar types of forces and capabilities, or “asymmetric” if forces and/or capabilities are significantly dissimilar. Asymmetric engagements with the enemy can create decisive advantages and be extremely lethal, especially if the force being attacked is not prepared to defend itself. Similarly, the joint force must be shielded against an enemy’s asymmetric attack.
 - e. The posture of the forces and their command relationships also facilitate establishing the **timing** and **tempo** of operations that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the adversary. Control of timing and tempo allows the JFC to remain unpredictable, operate beyond the enemy’s ability to react, and achieve dominance throughout the battlespace.
 - f. In applying the operational art, the JFC needs a clear understanding of the **operational reach** of friendly capabilities, including those that may be in support from locations outside the immediate theater of operations. This understanding will facilitate establishing the **operational approach**, proper lines of operations, and sequencing operations.
 - g. An understanding of the types of capabilities and **forces** available to the opponent will assist the JFC to focus campaign objectives, phasing, and timing. Opponents that do not have full force capabilities may have vulnerable key functions that provide the most lucrative targets for friendly attack. With an opponent who has a full range of **functions** and types of forces, friendly operations may be more effective by simultaneously engaging them all.
 - h. The JFC **arranges** elements of the campaign in time and space to exploit key friendly strengths and adversary vulnerabilities. This may be accomplished by a combination of simultaneous and sequential actions to achieve campaign objectives most effectively and rapidly. The campaign is typically organized by phases. Phasing assists commanders in thinking through an entire campaign, defining requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and manageable subordinate objectives. Phasing also leads to an orderly process of developing branches and sequels (which are crucial for anticipation and flexibility) and to help dissipate the fog of war. Branches and sequels in campaigns facilitate phasing a campaign and enable the JFC to maintain freedom of action in rapidly changing situations.
 - i. A central consideration in applying the operational art is the location and nature of adversary **centers of gravity** — those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.
 - j. Accurate identification of these COGs will assist in overall campaign planning and

in decisions by the JFC on the relative merits of simultaneous or sequential operations and **direct or indirect attack**. During execution of a campaign, COGs may change as the opponents act and react in relation to each other and cause changes in their relative capabilities.

k. Supporting the assessment of COGs is the identification of **decisive points**. These points may be geographic in nature (constrained sea lanes, hills, towns, and air bases), key events (attainment of air and naval superiority), and systemic conditions (effective command and control systems, adequate refueling and ammunition storage capacity). Control, destruction, or neutralization of decisive points by friendly forces can yield a marked advantage over the enemy and therefore influence the outcome of battles, operations, and campaigns.

l. At the outset of campaign design, the JFC and planners must consider **culmination**, the point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operation, offense or defense. For the offense, culmination is the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. For the

defense, culmination is the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible. An objective in campaign design is to compel the adversary into unanticipated culmination, avoid culmination for the friendly force, and achieve campaign objectives as quickly as possible.

m. Finally, **termination** is a component of strategy and the operational art. The end state envisioned for a campaign or major operation defines termination, identifying the point at which military operations may be brought to an end. For the Armed Forces of the United States, termination requires conditions in place that will support the desired US postconflict objectives and interests.

2. The Campaign

The campaign is an inherently joint instrument for planning the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States in military operations of all types. The campaign is based on US national security and military strategies as well as the mission assigned to the JFC. Campaign plans are normally comprehensive for all operations in a theater. Subordinate campaign plans prepared by joint task forces (JTFs) or subunified commands



Centers of gravity may be attacked directly or indirectly.



The Medal of Honor is Awarded to
Major Charles J. Loring Jr, United States Air Force

Maj Loring was the leader of a flight of 4 F-80 type aircraft on a close support mission near Sniper Ridge, North Korea, on 22 November 1952. Maj Loring was briefed by a controller to dive-bomb enemy gun positions which were harassing friendly ground troops. After verifying the location of the target, Maj Loring rolled into his dive bomb run. Throughout the run, extremely accurate ground fire was directed on his aircraft. Disregarding the accuracy and intensity of the ground fire, Maj Loring aggressively continued to press the attack until his aircraft was hit. At approximately 4,000 feet, he deliberately altered his course and aimed his diving aircraft at active gun emplacements concentrated on a ridge northwest of the briefed target, turned his aircraft 45 degrees to the left, pulled up in a deliberate, controlled maneuver, and elected to sacrifice his life by diving his aircraft directly into the midst of the enemy emplacements. His selfless and heroic action completely destroyed the enemy gun emplacement and eliminated a dangerous threat to United Nations ground forces.

may be appropriate in complex situations. Fundamental planning concepts underlie campaign planning. The campaign is oriented on a clear statement of the combatant commander's intent and the focus of operations, taking into account the objectives to be secured at national, strategic, and operational levels. To guide the conduct of operations, campaign planning identifies the opponent's COGs and related key areas of vulnerability. Planning also includes protection of friendly COGs and key areas of vulnerability, including considerations at the national and theater levels for the United States and other participating countries in the case of multinational operations. In complex situations and when forces needed for the operation must be deployed from other areas, joint planning includes phasing with the commander's intent for each phase clearly defined.

The campaign is **based on the commander's concept**, a broad vision that is the intellectual core of the campaign plan. The commander's concept begins by presenting the commander's intent, which defines the desired end state, concisely

expresses the purpose of the operation, and provides focus for subordinates. The commander's concept then describes how operations will be integrated, sequenced, and synchronized to achieve conflict termination objectives (including postconflict measures). The commander's concept normally includes four elements:

- The operational concept itself based on the unified command or theater strategy, which is the scheme for the entire operation;
- The logistic concept, which provides an overall description of how the joint force will be supported;
- The deployment concept, which describes the sequencing of operational capabilities and logistic support into the objective area; and
- The organizational concept, which includes external and internal command relationships and, when required, organization for deployment.

**OPERATION OVERLORD
A CLASSIC JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATION; KEYSTONE TO A
SUCCESSFUL COMBINED THEATER CAMPAIGN**

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, used two years of preparation and team-building leadership to create unity of effort for OVERLORD and the subsequent campaign to free Europe. This effective joint and combined staff operation owed much to Allied experiences in North Africa and the Mediterranean, and included a deputy of another Service and nation and subordinate commands for air, land, and naval forces. Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff provided the necessary but very elastic strategic guidance, directing him only to “Enter the continent of Europe, and ... undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.”

With the Combined Chiefs’ directive as guidance, General Eisenhower planned and directed a seven phase campaign to recapture Western Europe. The single guiding principle of this campaign was the destruction of the enemy’s forces.

Combined military deception operations reinforced this principle by causing the Germans to disperse significant forces outside the planned invasion area. Massive air bombardment interdicted railroads and bridges leading to the invasion area. Other Allied forces screened the invasion flanks by neutralizing enemy air and naval threats. During the night of 5 June airborne landings blocked key causeways, road junctions, and bridges leading to the amphibious assault area. Underwater demolition cleared paths through the obstacles blocking the seaward approaches. On 6 June 1944 naval gunfire and tactical air support proved indispensable in destroying German fortifications, troop concentrations, and minefields.

Although Allied invasion troops faced locally stout German resistance, once the bulk of the first wave was through the German beach defenses, the operational issue was no longer in doubt. Logistic preparation to support the invasion was so effective that by D+12, over 2,700 ships and 1,000 transport aircraft had landed 692,000 troops, 95,000 vehicles, and 228,000 tons of supplies. This build-up laid the foundations for the remaining phases of the overall campaign that was to reach its successful conclusion in May 1945.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources

The campaign is explained in more detail in JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

3. Unified Command and Theater Strategies

As a precursor to theater planning, combatant commands normally develop strategic estimates, command or theater

strategies, and supporting peacetime plans for their assigned responsibilities in order to implement US national security and military strategies. The connecting link between combatant command and national planning is the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. This plan, developed under CJCS authority assigns planning tasks, apportions major combat forces and resources, and issues planning guidance to the combatant commands. The resulting unified command and theater

strategies assist the combatant command and its components in the pursuit of unity of effort. These command and theater strategies provide the basis for campaign and operation plans, and for determining requirements for forces and resources to execute those plans. The strategies, plans, and resource requirements support a collaborative and iterative set of processes for joint strategic planning as well as for resource planning, programming, and resourcing.

4. Unified Action

Unified action describes the broad scope of activities taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or JTFs under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands for the purpose of achieving unity of effort in mission accomplishment. Unified action requires the integration of effort across the command. This includes joint, single-Service, special, and supporting operations; as well as interagency, NGOs, PVOs, and multinational participants into a unified effort in the theater or joint operations area. Military support of unified action is facilitated by operations under a single commander, in execution of a single plan, that encompass all assigned and supporting military and nonmilitary elements. Unified action within the military instrument of national power supports the national strategic unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of national power.

a. Unified action requires unified direction. The combatant command and theater strategies, including their derivative campaign and operation plans, provide that direction. The principles and considerations for unified action apply to US participation in multinational and interagency operations. Multinational operations may require unique command relationships that maintain unity of effort while not establishing a single multinational force commander.

b. For interagency operations abroad, including participation by NGOs and PVOs, the combatant commander may designate a JTF to conduct the military portion of interagency operations. For example, in counterdrug operations, combatant commanders may establish joint interagency task forces in their areas of responsibility. To facilitate operations, the combatant or joint task force commander may establish a civil-military operations center, other specialized functional coordination centers, and liaison teams to ensure unity of effort in the interagency actions.

c. A primary consideration for combatant command unified action is the primacy of the theater military objectives that directly relate to national security and military strategies. All Armed Forces of the United States participation in multinational and interagency operations abroad adhere to this principle.

d. In operations within US territory, the military instrument is normally subordinate to the national or other civil governmental agency with primary jurisdiction for the function or area concerned. This may require the provision of support from a standing task force formed specifically for the purpose of assisting civil authorities, or the formation of a special task-oriented organization for unique circumstances. In the defense of US territory, the FBI has responsibility for countering terrorism. For relief from natural and manmade disasters, the responsible Federal lead agency is the FEMA. To assure unity of effort, military activities under these circumstances should be conducted under standing or tailored JTFs that specifically support the lead Federal agency under terms stipulated by the President.

5. Command Relationships

Command is central to all military action, and **unity of command** (a principle of war) is central to **unity of effort** (a fundamental



Military assistance to civil authorities calls for unity of effort in support of the lead Federal agency.

of joint warfare). US military power is employed under JFCs. Unified action begins with unified direction. This is normally accomplished by assigning a mission or objective to a single commander, and providing that commander sufficient forces, other resources, and authority to accomplish the assigned mission or objective. The relationships between and among force elements follow a set of principles to establish a chain of command, facilitate the best possible utilization of all available capabilities, and ensure unified action in mission accomplishment. Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates. Command confers the authority to assign missions and to demand accountability for their attainment. The four command relationships are combatant command (command authority), that only combatant commanders can exercise; operational control; tactical control; and support. In addition, there are another three authorities. They are administrative control, which permits exercise of authority over subordinate organizations for administration and support; coordinating authority; and direct liaison authorized. Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve

themselves of the responsibility for the attainment of those missions. Authority is never absolute. The extent of authority is limited by the establishing instruction, directives, and law.

See JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), for additional information.

a. **Exercise of Command.** The primary emphasis in command relations should be to keep the chain of command short and simple so that it is clear who is in charge and of what. Unity of command is the guiding principle of war in the exercise of command. The systems that support the exercise of command are similarly guided by time-tested principles. These systems — including command, control, communications, computers, and information systems and networks — should be reliable, survivable, flexible, interoperable, timely, and secure.

- In the exercise of command and the control of operations, commanders should adhere to two key tenets: clarity in the statement of the commander's intent, so that all subordinates understand the conditions to be established by successful operations and, therefore,

define the military criteria for termination; and simplicity of orders. JFCs should use their liaisons to assist in directing the actions of the force in anticipation of a developing situation and in assuring shared understanding of missions and situations.

- Continuity of command is essential for continuity of operations. Commanders are responsible for assuring continuity of command in the event they or their headquarters become incapacitated or unavailable, therefore, JFCs must make provisions for continuity of command, control, and communications in a severely degraded communications environment. Continuity is assured by defining the succession of command, designating alternate headquarters, and stipulating those circumstances under which another will assume command and the procedures for such assumption. The command should strive for redundancy of means and the reduction or elimination of unique nodes.
- The components of a joint force may be comprised of Service elements or functional elements such as special operations forces. JFCs may organize their forces as necessary to accomplish the command's mission. Nevertheless, subordinate units should be permitted to function within the parameters of their design and capabilities, mission and circumstances permitting.
- The role of component commanders in a joint force merits special attention. Component commanders are first expected to orchestrate the activity of their own forces, branches, and warfare communities. In addition, they must understand how their own capabilities best integrate into the overall design to most effectively satisfy the JFC's intent. Component commanders are also the

primary sources of advice to the JFC and their fellow component commanders on their requirements for support from, and their capabilities for support to, other component commanders.

- The contributions of training, leader development, and education are indispensable to effective command. Leaders acquire their joint skills in sequential and progressive systems of education, training, self-development, and assignments of increasing Service and joint responsibility. Leaders in the Armed Forces of the United States should understand and make every effort to avail themselves of the opportunities for joint professional development, education, and training.
- The exercise of command takes place against the backdrop of the adversary's command structure. The joint warfare fundamental of knowledge of the enemy is indispensable for effective command. The JFC, supported by the analysis of the command's staff, must be able to identify peculiarities and vulnerabilities that will enable the joint force to destroy the adversary's command capability early in the action. This will facilitate the destruction, neutralization, or degradation of the adversary force's capabilities.

b. Supported and Supporting Relationships. Supported and supporting relationships between commands facilitate unified action in planning and conducting operations. Support is a command authority established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when an organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. It may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. This includes the NCA designating a support relationship between combatant commanders



**The Medal of Honor is Awarded to
Lieutenant Harvey C. Barnum Jr, United States Marine Corps**

On 18 December 1965, near Ky Phu in Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam, 1st Lt Barnum's company was suddenly pinned down by a hail of extremely accurate enemy fire. The company was quickly separated from the remainder of the battalion by over 500 meters of open and fire-swept ground, and casualties mounted rapidly. Lt Barnum quickly made a hazardous reconnaissance of the area, seeking targets for his artillery. Finding the rifle company commander mortally wounded and the radio operator killed, he, with complete disregard for his safety, gave aid to the dying commander, then removed the radio from the dead operator and strapped it to himself. He immediately assumed command of the rifle company, and moving at once into the midst of the heavy fire, rallying and giving encouragement to all units, reorganized them to replace the loss of key personnel and led their attack on enemy positions from which deadly fire continued to come. His sound and swift decisions and his obvious calm served to stabilize the badly decimated units and his gallant example as he stood exposed repeatedly to point out targets served as an inspiration to all. Provided with 2 armed helicopters, he moved fearlessly through enemy fire to control the air attack against the firmly entrenched enemy while skillfully directing 1 platoon in a successful counterattack on the key enemy positions. Having thus cleared a small area, he requested and directed the landing of 2 transport helicopters for the evacuation of the dead and wounded. He then assisted in the mopping up and final seizure of the battalion's objective.

as well as within a combatant command. Within a combatant command, JFCs may designate one of their components or subordinate joint forces as a supported activity for a certain purpose and time. In fulfilling that responsibility, the supported commanders must coordinate, synchronize, and integrate the activities of the supporting commands in conjunction with their own forces under the JFC's overall supervision and authority. More than one supported command may be designated simultaneously and components may simultaneously receive and provide support in different mission areas, functions, or operations. (These relationships are further described in subordinate doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.)

- The supported commander has authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort, unless limited by a specific directive. This includes

designating and establishing priorities for targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, effects of the action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency of the operation for which the support is provided.

- The supporting commander is responsible for determining the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to employ in providing support. The supporting commander is also responsible for ascertaining the needs of the supported force and taking action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

c. **Integration of Service and Functional Component Capabilities.** Centralized planning and direction, and decentralized

execution facilitate integration of all elements of a joint force. That is, integration is accomplished through the development of command and theater strategies, campaign and operation plans, operation orders and other mission directives as well as forms of organization that achieve the greatest synergy and make the best use of the combined effects of all available capabilities.

- The joint force's organization for combat should promote integration and may include Service and functional component commands. The combatant commander has Service component commands comprising the force elements assigned from the particular Service. Combatant commanders and subordinate subunified and joint task force

commanders have the authority to centralize selected functions and establish functional component commands to perform those functions. The functional component commander is normally a Service component commander with the preponderance of forces and the capability for performing required command and control functions.

- Regardless of the particular form of organization, the principles of war and military operations other than war, and the fundamentals of joint warfare, apply to the operations of the joint force and its components, Service components, and functional components in order to assure unified action.

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CHAPTER VI

FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

“A Task Force Commander who creates a close knit interagency working relationship can focus on getting the mission accomplished without the distractions created by outside agencies or attempts to fulfill special agendas that might be disruptive to the operation.”

RADM Michael D. Haskins, USN

The purposes of joint doctrine for military participation in interagency operations are to guide the proper employment of the military instrument and to assure unity of effort with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power. Interagency operations may be conducted in the United States and abroad. Combatant commanders and other JFCs must consider the potential requirements for interagency operations as a part of their activities across the range of military operations. Early inclusion of interagency considerations in assessments, estimates, and plans will facilitate civil-military integration of effort, focus the appropriate military participation, and assist the military effort to obtain the best available support from other interagency participants. The guidance outlined in this chapter supplements the authority of combatant commanders to take immediate action in response to incidents on their installations, domestic and abroad, as well as in support of a host country abroad.

1. The Interagency Process and Participants

The interagency process facilitates unified action by military and nonmilitary participants conducting interagency operations in pursuit of national objectives.

a. At the highest level the NSC is the lead agency for national security civil-military integration. Its responsibilities are focused on integrating advice and recommendations for consideration and decision by the President

as well as disseminating and monitoring implementation of those decisions. Interagency groups within the NSC system permit task-organized participation at the appropriate level by agencies (including military representation) involved in any particular interagency task. The Secretary of Defense is a statutory member of the NSC, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is its statutory military advisor. Officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense represent the Secretary in NSC interagency groups. Similarly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by the Joint Staff, represents the combatant commanders for interagency matters in the NSC system.

b. Interagency organization for matters that are primarily nonmilitary but may require military participation are organized under appropriate lead agencies abroad and in the United States. Overseas, ordinarily the US ambassador and the country team take the lead. At the national level, for support of overseas interagency operations, normally the Department of State leads the effort, forming task-oriented groups or availing itself of the NSC system to organize the effort. For domestic interagency operations that may require military participation, the FEMA has the lead for mitigating the consequences of natural and manmade disasters and civil defense, and the FBI for crises relating to terrorism. The Secretary of Defense retains the authority to approve use of combatant command resources for assistance to civil authorities. For military support in response to natural and manmade disasters, the Army's

Director for Military Support (DOMS) is the focal point and has the capabilities needed to organize, integrate, and provide military assistance for approved operations. The United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is responsible for providing military assistance within CONUS for managing and mitigating the consequences of, the deliberate use of, or accidents involving, NBC, radiological, and other high-yield explosive weapons.

c. Operations abroad may involve a variety of US Government agencies, international organizations (such as the United Nations and its subordinate agencies), regional transnational organizations (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for African Unity, and the Organization of American States), NGOs (such as Doctors Without Borders and Save the Children Fund), and PVOs (such as the American Red Cross and CARE (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere)). In addition to US Government agencies, domestic participants may include a number of state and local government organizations as well as the types of NGOs and PVOs that operate internationally.

2. Interagency Coordination

a. The guidelines for interagency coordination assure that all participating agencies, under appropriate authority, focus their efforts for domestic or foreign operations. The Armed Forces of the United States have unique capabilities to offer for interagency operations. These include influence through established military-to-military domestic and international contacts; resources such as logistics not available to nonmilitary agencies; and responsiveness based on military training and readiness. Additional unique military capabilities include command and control resources supported by worldwide communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance infrastructures; robust organizational and planning processes, training support for large numbers of individuals on myriad skills, and air and sea mobility support for intertheater or intratheater requirements. Four general considerations apply to civil-military preparations for interagency activities.

- The Department of Defense must develop consensus on and approval of the desired scope, nature, and end state of military participation.



Operations abroad may involve a variety of US and international agencies, such as in this meeting of US Army, UN, Serb, and Croat officials on de-mining in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

- Participating agencies must clearly understand their respective missions, capabilities, and methods of operation.
- The agencies must develop a shared appreciation of their individual and mutual needs, and develop the fundamental rules to conduct operations and to promote confidence in their interdependence.
- Participating agencies should establish their short-term objectives, both individually and collectively, in the context of the long term desired end state in order to assure the value of the operation beyond its immediate conclusion.

“The necessary first step in shaping effective interagency groups is making known what skills and resources one brings to the table.”

ADM P. D. Miller, USN

b. Domestic Operations. Military participation in operations inside the United States and its territories may include assistance for domestic emergencies that result from natural or manmade causes, or assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies. Military assistance may be approved by the President or the Secretary of Defense — depending on the circumstances — for interagency actions to cope with contingencies such as civil disturbances, counterdrug operations, support for combatting terrorism, and other events for which the Armed Forces of the United States may have unique and essential capabilities.

- In domestic situations, the Constitution, law, and other governmental directives limit the scope and nature of military actions. The National Guard has unique roles in domestic operations. Under control of the respective states, National Guard units provide a wide variety of direct support to civil authorities, whereas

military forces under Federal control must adhere to the provisions of the *Posse Comitatus Act*. This act, together with related DOD regulations, prohibits the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy from participating in civilian law enforcement activities within the United States. In its maritime law enforcement role, the US Coast Guard is a unique branch of the Armed Forces with jurisdiction in both US waters and on the high seas and the only military Service not constrained by the *Posse Comitatus Act*. Domestic interagency operations are conducted under the control of a lead Federal or state agency. Early in the planning phase and following approval by the Secretary of Defense of a request for assistance, the military and nonmilitary participants must define the appropriate scope of military participation, consistent with applicable law and policy.

- In the event of a domestic crisis or natural or manmade disaster, the Armed Forces of the United States may provide assistance as approved by the Secretary of Defense to the responsible governmental agencies, normally the FBI and FEMA. Military assistance may include direct support for planning, organizing, and employing military capabilities under control of the USJFCOM. USJFCOM is responsible for providing military assistance to civil authorities for a range of domestic contingencies, and has unique mission responsibilities for managing and mitigating the consequences of deliberate use of, or accidents involving, NBC, radiological, and other high-yield explosive weapons. USJFCOM may provide approved support in such circumstances, supplementing the efforts of Federal, state, or local elements first responding to the disaster.

c. Foreign Operations

- Interagency operations in foreign areas may arise as a result of risks to US interests or those of US allies or other friendly countries. Such operations may involve preexisting bilateral and multilateral military relationships, treaties involving US defense interests, initiatives concerning technology transfer or armaments cooperation and control, foreign humanitarian assistance, peace operations, or other contingencies.
- Within a theater, the geographic combatant commander is responsible for planning and implementing military strategies and operations that require interagency coordination. Coordination required outside the geographic region may be supported by groups within the NSC system or individual Departments, with lead for such coordination falling either to the combatant command or the Federal agency depending on the circumstances. In some operations, a Special Representative of the President or Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General may be involved.
- The formal US interagency structure in foreign countries operates under the lead of the US ambassador and the country team, and may include US Information Service and US embassy public affairs representation. The US ambassador is ordinarily the lead agent for interagency operations abroad that are essentially nonmilitary in nature but require military participation, with representation and control of the military operations provided by the JFC.

3. Command Relationships

a. Command relationships in interagency operations differ from joint and multinational operations. In interagency operations,

command relationships preserve the primacy of civil authorities in their spheres of responsibility while facilitating the full utilization of military forces as permitted by the Constitution, law, and directives of the President. Military commands normally provide assistance in consonance with these directives for activities conducted under the control of civil authorities.

b. The NCA ordinarily establish supported and supporting command relationships between combatant commanders when issuing the deployment and execution orders for the particular interagency operation requiring military involvement. The geographic combatant commanders, supported by functional combatant or other joint force commands, provide the forces and resources to accomplish the mission.

c. The relationship between NGOs and PVOs and US military elements is an associate or partnership relationship. These civilian organizations do not operate in military or governmental hierarchies and therefore cannot have formal supporting or supported relationships with US military forces.

4. Organizing for Interagency Operations

a. The organizational guidelines for joint and multinational action apply to organizing for interagency operations with deference to differences in command relationships, legal strictures, and national policy. In all interagency operations, foreign and domestic, military commanders have inherent responsibilities. These include the requirements to clarify the mission; determine the controlling legal and policy authorities; task, organize, direct, sustain, and care for the organizations and personnel provided for the interagency effort; and assure seamless termination under conditions which assure that identified national objectives are met and can be sustained after the operation.

INTEGRATING INTERAGENCY PLANNING

Our experiences in Kosovo and elsewhere have demonstrated the necessity to ensure that all concerned government agencies conduct comprehensive planning to encompass the full range of instruments available to decision makers. We all must move forward with our efforts to achieve increased levels of integrated interagency planning now. To better support other agencies, DOD needs to give greater consideration to political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, information, and other nonmilitary activities in defense planning. In addition, the US Government must establish dedicated mechanisms and integrated planning processes to ensure rapid, effective, well-structured, multi-agency efforts in response to crises. Finally, we must continue to emphasize that our senior officials routinely participate in rehearsals, gaming, exercises, and simulations, as well as the CP IWG [Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group] - which has become a genuine leap forward in the effort to establish a sound system to incorporate crisis and deliberate planning across the interagency.

SOURCE: CJCS Posture Statement before the 106th Congress Committee, On Armed Services, United States Senate, 8 February 2000

b. For interagency operations abroad, combatant commands establish a process for ensuring effective organization for and conduct of the operation including a number of specific tasks.

- Identification of all agencies and organizations that are or should be involved in the operation.
- Establishment of an interagency hierarchy and definition of the objectives of the response effort pertinent to the operation as a whole and to each participating agency.
- Definition of COAs for both theater military operations and agency activities.
- Solicitation from each agency, department, or organization of a clear understanding of the role that each plays.
- Identification of potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities.

- Identification of resources of each participant in order to reduce duplication and increase coherence in the collective effort.
- Definition of the desired end state and exit criteria.
- Sharing of relevant intelligence to those with a need to know subject to US and command security standards.
- Focus of the mission’s assets to support the longer-term goals of the enterprise.
- Establishment of a liaison section, interagency assessment teams, civil-military operations centers, humanitarian assistance coordination centers, and logistic operations centers as required.

c. For interagency operations (excluding terrorism and the management of the consequences of an incident involving weapons of mass destruction) within the United States and its territories, DOMS



US Marines provide security for UN investigation of war crimes. The JTF must remain aware of all agencies involved in operations.

organizes the military effort following authorization by the Secretary of Defense and acts directly with the JFC. In circumstances involving domestic terrorism, the NCA must specifically approve military assistance for the interagency effort.

5. JTF Interagency Operations

a. There are specific policies and procedures that guide JTF interagency operations. The

unique aspects of the interagency process require the JTF headquarters to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of not only the JTF's components, but other agencies as well. When designating a JTF, the combatant commander will select the JTF commander, assign a joint operations area, specify a mission, provide planning guidance, allocate forces from the assigned Service and functional component commands, ensure that supporting commands understand assistance required, and request forces as necessary from the NCA.

b. In contrast to the established command structure of a combatant command or JTF, NGOs and PVOs in the operational area may not have a defined structure for controlling activities. Upon identifying organizational or operational mismatches between organizations, the staff of the combatant command or JTF should designate points in the NGOs and PVOs at which liaison and coordinating mechanisms are appropriate.

c. In order to best coordinate military and civilian operations, the JTF should establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC) near the JTF command center. The CMOC is composed of representatives from military, civilian, US, and multinational agencies involved in the operation. An effective CMOC contributes to meeting the objectives of all represented agencies in a cooperative and efficient manner.

CHAPTER VII

FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

"In war it is not always possible to have everything go exactly as one likes. In working with allies it sometimes happens that they develop opinions of their own."

Sir Winston Churchill

1. Overview

a. Since the Revolutionary War, American military operations have benefited from participation by other like-minded countries. The United States has habitually conducted military operations abroad, typically in alliances and coalitions. The Armed Forces of the United States must be prepared to operate abroad within a multinational framework, and should be prepared to operate under other-than-US leadership.

b. All US force commanders participating in multinational operations have key roles that require acute political sensitivity in addition to military leadership skills. They must build the mutual confidence that is the basis for effective multinational cooperative action. Four tenets guide the Armed Forces of the United States in multinational cooperative activities: respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, and patience.

- **Respect.** American military history confirms the importance of genuine partnership based on mutual respect between the United States and its diverse foreign comrades in arms. This includes respect for each partner's culture, religion, customs, history, and values. Each participant has unique capabilities from which the entire multinational operation can obtain maximum benefit only on the basis of mutual respect.
- **Rapport.** Harmonious relations among participants in multinational operations facilitate teamwork and result in unity of

effort. Rapport is a personal direct relationship. Commanders must establish the environment and set the example for developing rapport among subordinate commanders, staffs, and individual members of US commands.

- **Knowledge of Partners.** The challenges of interoperability and unity of effort underscore the importance of mutual knowledge of each other among the multinational participants. US commanders in multinational operations must devote the time and resources to know and understand their comrades in arms. This effort is as important to success as the effort to understand the adversary.
- **Patience.** Developing mutual respect, rapport, and mutual knowledge among multinational partners takes time and the concerted efforts of leaders. US commanders at all levels must lead, setting the example of untiring and even-handed patience, focusing on eliciting the best possible performance from the integration of US and multinational partners' forces.

2. Definition and Types of Multinational Operations

a. Multinational operations is a collective term used to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of an alliance or coalition. An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more

nations for broad, long-term objectives, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action; Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990-1991 were coalition operations. Multinational operations encompass activities across the range of military operations.

b. Planning for multinational operations is accomplished in national and international channels. Collective security goals, strategies, and plans are developed in accordance with alliance, individual treaty, or special coalition arrangements. Whether under alliance or coalition auspices, peacetime preparations are vital to ensure the most effective possible performance in war. Therefore, peacetime activities that stress the participation of all multinational partners' armed forces in training, exercises, leader development, education, and liaison and expert personnel exchanges lay the groundwork for success in crisis and war.

3. Strategic Context

The strategic context for multinational operations includes a diversity of national objectives and cultures, the challenges of unified action with disparate force capabilities and resources, and the requirements of public information. Partners in multinational operations will share areas in common alongside unique areas for each partner. A principal initial objective in multinational operations is for the prospective partners to ensure that the areas held in common are sufficient to sustain the operation to a commonly-agreed end state, and that the unique areas are not sufficiently different to threaten the common enterprise.

a. **National objectives** during multinational operations, particularly those in which the United States may be one of the few participants from outside the theater of



Respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, and patience guide multinational cooperative activities.

operations, must be clarified and reconciled. Preferably, this consensus should be reached before the initial phases, during which declarations of intent and policy as well as brandishing of deterrent options by the multinational partners take place for the purpose of deterring the adversary. If this agreement is delayed until after the first bullet is fired, proper preparation and consultation of publics and government agencies among participants to assure support over the course of the operation may not be possible.

b. **Methods of operation and individual behavior** that respect the cultural and religious differences among and between partners are essential in multinational operations, particularly in developing teamwork based upon mutual trust and respect. Similarly important is reaching early agreement on roles and missions for each

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE — CONSENSUS IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization proved to be flexible, effective, and ultimately successful during a uniquely challenging time in its history. Despite domestic pressures in many NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] nations, an enormous humanitarian crisis, and isolated instances of target misidentification with incidental injury or collateral damage, the nations of the alliance held firm and unified and saw the operation through to a successful conclusion. . . . Admittedly, gaining consensus among 19 democratic nations is not easy and can only be achieved through discussion and compromise. However, the NATO alliance is also our greatest strength. It is true that there were differences of opinion within the alliance. This is to be expected in an alliance of democracies, and building consensus generally leads to sounder decisions.

SOURCE: *Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, DOD Report to Congress, 31 January 2000

partner that respects their equality while focusing on their best contributions to the multinational effort (e.g., intratheater ground transportation, human intelligence, specially trained close combat units). Clear roles, missions, and rules of engagement (ROE) are essential for proper planning, training, and rehearsals, and therefore are a cornerstone of effective multinational unified action.

c. **Military resource and capability differences**, particularly between partners of modest means and the United States, present serious challenges. Combatant commanders must perform unbiased assessments of the resource and capability needs and disparities between US and other forces in order to present unsatisfied requirements and limitations to the NCA for consideration. For instance, if not covered by a more capable partner, lack of missile defense, offensive air support, or individual NBC protective clothing and equipment may seriously constrain participation of a country's forces and constitute fatal vulnerabilities in the multinational structure. Such deficiencies would be significant enough to warrant consideration of providing additional

resources from US sources or cross-leveling resources in the theater. In any case, important disparities should be resolved before plans are completed and operations undertaken.

d. The global visibility of operations in which the United States participates places special responsibilities and burdens on US commanders. This is all the more so in multinational operations in which the approach to information, media access, and the role of the public may differ among participating countries. While US forces must respect the differences among partners, they cannot fail to discharge their responsibilities for timely and accurate information to the public and all branches of the USG. Therefore, it may be necessary for the combatant commander to establish special procedures so that media access and public information activities required by US policy can take place without directly conflicting with the requirements of other partners in the multinational operation. Similarly, combatant commanders must ensure that they enforce the standards of operations security while providing needed information, intelligence, and other access to multinational partners.

e. **Command and Control of US Forces in Multinational Operations**

- Unity of effort assuring unified action for multinational operations requires clear and effective command and control structures for the entire endeavor focused on common objectives, plans, desired end states, and ROE. Multinational partners must provide the multinational force commander sufficient authority over their national forces to achieve this unity. In turn, multinational force commanders and staffs exercise their authority to unify the efforts of the multinational force toward common objectives. Consensus and compromise are vital in multinational military operations characterized by voluntary participation by the partners who retain their sovereignty and national interests.
- The President retains command authority over US forces involved in multinational operations. When prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of effort) the President may agree to place appropriate US forces under the control of a foreign commander in order to achieve specified military objectives. To support a Presidential decision on multinational command relationships, senior military leaders are responsible for providing information on such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE. In standing alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, command arrangements are established by agreement of all members.
- In general, a foreign commander's authority over US forces will depend on the nature and goals of the mission and must be clearly defined for each multinational operation. Within the

limits of this authority, a foreign commander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces outside the operational area agreed to by the President. A foreign commander cannot separate US units, redistribute US supplies, administer discipline, promote US personnel, or change internal US force organization unless agreed to by the NCA. US commanders always maintain the right and authority to report separately and directly to higher US authorities, regardless of the agreed authority of the foreign commander over US forces. For matters perceived as illegal under US or international law, or outside the mandate of the mission to which the United States has agreed, US commanders will first attempt resolution with the appropriate foreign commanders. If issues remain unresolved, the US commanders will refer the matters to higher US authorities. The chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander in the field remains inviolate. These same considerations apply when foreign forces are placed under the authority of a US commander. Nations do not relinquish their national interests by participating in multinational operations. US commanders must be prepared to deal with these issues as they arise during an operation.

f. **Multinational Force Commander.** The commander of the multinational force may be a serving commander of a military arm of an alliance when the alliance conducts the multinational operation, or a commander nominated by the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources and approved by the other partners. The extent of the multinational force commander's authority is determined by agreement of the multinational participants and is seldom absolute. As in the case of a joint US headquarters, a multinational force headquarters and staff should reflect the



Multinational partners must provide the multinational force commander sufficient authority to achieve unity of effort.

general composition of the force as a whole. This includes all the essential areas of joint and multinational operations competence, as well as the unique partnership of individual experts and representatives. The objective of the command team is to unify the various participating force elements and assure harmonious operations and effective unified action.

g. Multinational Command Structures.

Formal alliances typically establish integrated command structures, with participation reflecting the composition of the alliance. Alliances may also place their forces under the command of one participant; the lead nation with the preponderance of the force. Temporary coalitions formed to pursue specific, limited multinational operations generally rely on three types of command structures: parallel command, lead nation command, and a combination of the two. In terms of components, multinational commands may be composed of national commands with subordinate Service components and functional components, multinational functional component commands with subordinate national functional commands, or other combinations

tailored to the situation and capabilities of partners.

- In a **parallel** command, participating countries retain command and control of their deployed forces. Unity of effort and unified action are effected through multinational coordinating councils at the level of the national commanders, with tactical control of individual national components being assigned to other national commanders under bilateral agreements.
- In a **lead nation** command, participants subordinate their forces to the commander of the partner providing the preponderance of forces and resources.
- Parallel and lead nation command structures may exist simultaneously in a multinational operation. This **combination** may occur when two or more partners control a number of participants.

Typically, a multinational authority with representatives of heads of state or government (the NCA in the case of the

United States) provides common strategic direction to the multinational military command. For the United States, the NCA retains its command relationship directly to the combatant commander when acting as US force commander.

4. Considerations

In addition to the strategic context, there are considerations for multinational unity of effort that are based on political, military, legal, and civil-military aspects of the participating countries and civilian organizations operating in the theater. It is important to take these considerations into account in initial planning for the formation of the multinational endeavor when it is not conducted by an existing alliance that has already shaped its procedures.

a. Political and Military Considerations.

International and domestic political imperatives influence the behavior of national political and military leaders and organizations in multinational operations. It is unrealistic to expect that strongly held national perspectives and preferences would be set aside entirely in favor of a common multinational formula. Therefore, the forms of participation, decision making, and assignment of military tasks may have to be adapted to accommodate important national needs. Multinational force commanders must be aware of the differences in political constraints and military capabilities of the forces under their direction and establish procedures and assign tasks accordingly. Commanders will routinely work directly with political authorities in the theater of operations. The commander's role as diplomat should not be underestimated.

- Among the most important military considerations are the doctrine, level of training, leadership style, and hardware types and capabilities of the participants. A basic challenge in multinational

operations is the effective integration and employment of all assets provided toward the achievement of common objectives. Early in multinational operational planning, efforts to achieve a level of standardization and interoperability should be made through the provision of training assistance, liaison teams, sharing of resources, and providing entire units for support in functional areas of deficiency (air defense, fire support, and armor are examples). An important concern of the commander is obtaining the maximum effectiveness from the multinational force in accomplishing the mission. When forces have disparate capabilities, mission assignments should optimize force effectiveness. To the extent possible, forces with greater capabilities should not be constrained by forces with lesser capabilities. To reduce disparities among participating forces, minimum capability standards should be established and a certification process developed. Identified shortcomings should be satisfied by either bilateral or multilateral support agreements.

- Multinational commanders must give high priority to planning and conducting training events and rehearsals for key aspects of the planned operation in order to assure requisite overall force readiness and interoperability.

"... we need an agreed way for doctrine to capture how we deal with multinational and interagency operations. The EUCOM experiences . . . have indicated that training and shared ideas (about such issues as operations, organization, and commitment to civilian control of the military) are paramount to multinational and interagency operations. And the key to the military aspects of multinational operations is doctrine."

GEN George A. Joulwan, USA

- Of prime importance in multinational operations is the integration of separate command, control, communications, and computer systems; intelligence; and logistic systems. Normally, national forces maintain separate intelligence and logistic structures. Unless alliance structures already exist to integrate these vital functional areas, multinational commanders must establish effective coordination mechanisms, realizing that US capabilities are likely to be more capable and sophisticated than those of most other participating forces. The US combatant commander must understand what US intelligence may be shared and ensure that the process is in place to provide that intelligence in a timely manner to the level needed by other participants. Similarly with logistics, the US combatant commander must know what US resources may be made available, on routine or emergency basis, to other forces with vital needs.

b. Integration of International Organizations (IOs), NGOs, PVOs, and Contractors. Many host country governmental and civilian agencies, IOs, NGOs, PVOs, and civilian contractors routinely carry out activities to assist in nation development, ameliorate suffering, and

support military forces in peace and war. As in the case of US interagency operations, combatant commanders must be cognizant of these organizations and their actions. To the extent possible, commanders should assure that these organizations' efforts and the military efforts are integrated, complementary, or not in conflict; and establish coordination and mutual support mechanisms as needed to eliminate or mitigate conflict and support US goals in the region. Since the NGOs and PVOs in the operational area may not have a defined structure for controlling activities, the multinational command may establish liaison sections, assessment teams, civil-military operations centers, humanitarian assistance coordination centers, and logistic operations centers as required. Other civil affairs support may also be required and should be provided, as resources permit, by the United States and other participating countries.

"Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire-support operations center."

Gen A.C. Zinni, USMC

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CHAPTER VIII

ADDRESSING THE FUTURE

"If successful war-making depended upon masses of men, this country would be at least fourth down the list of world powers. If it depended on world-girdling colonies, possessions, and sea bases, we should definitely have to take secondary position. But when it depends upon technological progress, mass production and men capable of intelligent use of intricate machines, we are in a field where America can be second to none."

Gen Jimmy Doolittle, USAF

The Armed Forces of the United States simultaneously participate in shaping the strategic environment to prevent war, respond when deterrence fails, and prepare for an uncertain future. Mindful of the lessons of the past, the Armed Forces maintain required core competencies, identify future challenges, and transform forces to meet those challenges. An essential element in addressing the future is the development of operational concepts that focus on the challenges that joint forces may encounter. These concepts should seek to exploit US national advantages, enable dominance against any adversary and circumstance across the range of military operations, and reduce the likelihood of surprise. Concepts for the future should not be constrained by current joint doctrine; rather, joint doctrine provides the foundation and point of departure for thinking about future American military power.

The Services and USSOCOM have the primary responsibility for future force development, and the functional defense agencies have the responsibility of providing specified combat support services to warfighting forces. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the combatant commanders — has a special responsibility for identifying, providing assessments of, and providing guidance for meeting the challenges that may face joint forces in the future. To guide joint initiatives focused on the future, the Chairman periodically disseminates a joint

vision document. This document is the basis for studies and analyses, including joint concept development and experimentation which identify plausible future operational capabilities and explore the challenges across the range of military operations that may confront the Armed Forces of the United States.

1. Identifying Future Challenges

a. The joint process in place to assist in shaping the future is focused on contemporary projections of future challenges. These challenges address many areas essential for developing and fielding military forces for joint operations, including concepts and doctrine, organizational design, education and training for individuals and units, leader development, logistic support, personnel, and facilities. The concepts for overcoming the challenges should assume a range of adversaries, from the most primitive to peer competitors able to threaten US interests and engage US forces directly and indirectly in symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare.

b. Advanced technologies alone will not win future wars. Properly led, trained, and equipped people from all the Services will remain the surest guarantor of success in war. Therefore, in developing joint concepts for the future, it is important to maintain a mix of the scientific and technological, and the human dimension.

- The American experience has produced global leadership in science and technology. Technological innovation has been an important catalyst for change for the United States and has been a major contributor to American military power. To shape and harness future technology for military use, joint and Service programs should focus on three fundamental requisites.
 - First, the Armed Forces must remain abreast of the leading edge of American and foreign science and technology so that new developments and their promise can be professionally incorporated into military statements of future requirements.
 - Second, identify those challenges that may not be overcome in the future without technological breakthroughs. Since the civil sector will not necessarily pursue challenges that are unique to military operations, government-sponsored research and development must do so.
 - Third, the design of future capabilities must avoid dependence on unique systems whose malfunction may result in mission failure.
- Perennial challenges for joint, multinational, and interagency operations are the interoperability of the elements and the integration of their capabilities. Concepts designed for future operations should address these challenges along two paths.
 - One would provide for common development of capabilities for military organizations across Services, agencies, and commands so that their resulting capabilities are inherently interoperable.
 - The second should allow for adapting extant capabilities that were not developed in common to assure interoperability. Both approaches are essential and should not be viewed as being mutually exclusive. The United States does not know now with whom it may want to engage in cooperative military operations in the future. While the logic of maximum common development clearly applies to the Armed Forces of the United States, it cannot apply to all potential interagency and multinational partners with whom operations may be necessary. As a consequence, the Armed Forces of the United States must remain abreast of developments in the civilian sector so that civil-military integration may be readily achieved in the future. Continuous liaison with civilian centers of innovation, including educational and research institutions, can take advantage of the pace and scope of American technological progress and offer the promise of synergy and reduced costs. Similarly, cooperation with foreign pacesetters in the fields of military art and civilian science and technology offer similar benefits for future multinational interoperability.
- In developing concepts and harnessing technology for the future, the Armed Forces of the United States must be aware of the progress of potential adversaries and multinational partners in order to avoid circumstances in which the least capable partner defines the combat potential of the entire multinational force. The requirements of future interoperability may require the sharing of technology, education, and training programs with potential partners. In all cases, the Armed Forces of the United States must maintain the ability to operate

effectively unilaterally as well as with multinational partners, regardless of their capabilities.

- Interoperability cannot rely solely on technology. Joint concepts must take into account modes of operations and the traditions of all military forces as well as the human factor that is a dominant characteristic of the culture. In future joint and multinational operations, as in the present, the simple exchange of liaison elements may be the most important guarantee of interoperability.
- American military men and women of the future will reflect the characteristics of the Nation’s citizenry: its values, ethnic and cultural diversity, intellect and initiative, and thirst for advancement based on equality and respect for human rights. Worldwide trends and characteristics in civilian and military demography, values, and infrastructures will shape the environment and the military organizations of potential adversaries and partners. Joint concepts for future operations must incorporate the projected human dimensions.

“Well, the main thing — that I have remembered all my life — is the definition of esprit de corps. Now my definition — the definition I was taught, and I’ve always believed in — is that esprit de corps means love for one’s military legion, in my case the United States Marine Corps. I also learned that this loyalty to one’s Corps travels both ways, up and down.”

**LtGen Louis “Chesty” Puller,
USMC**

- It will be American military personnel who employ new technologies and fill any gaps in interoperability. Future concepts must account for people as the

most important national resource and contribute to an environment in which they can succeed and take pride in their profession. Retention of trained individuals will continue to be essential to military effectiveness as technology advances.

2. Preparing for Change and the Future

Shaping the future in the present calls for a blend of continuity and audacious innovation.

a. Analysis supported by modeling, simulation, and experimentation has a vital role in developing the future Armed Forces of the United States. Modeling and simulation are useful in representing conceptual systems that do not yet exist and systems that cannot be subjected to actual experimentation because of safety requirements and the limitations of resources and facilities. Experimentation assists in illuminating areas that theory alone cannot resolve. Some uncertainties cannot be removed without empirical evidence; experimentation coupled with sound military judgment can help provide that evidence.

b. The Services have been, and will continue to be, actively involved in experimentation to help define their futures. At the same time, a vigorous joint experimentation program is necessary to support the requirements of joint, multinational, and interagency operations. The USJFCOM is the DOD executive agent, and is responsible to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for joint warfighting experimentation. Joint experimentation is a concepts-based process focused on the capabilities required by future JFCs. It should keep in view developments in US and foreign civilian and military centers of innovation. While joint experimentation with all US



Joint experimentation is a concepts-based process focused on the capabilities required by future JFCs.

participants is clearly necessary, it should lay the groundwork for future multinational interoperability with potential partners.

c. Educational and research institutions, military and civilian, have a significant role in the preparation of the Armed Forces of the United States for change and the future. Civilian universities and military education institutions have unique capabilities, especially in concept development and experimentation. With their resident expertise in wide areas of knowledge, educational and research institutions are sources of conceptual proposals for transforming the future force and may serve well as a sounding board for proposed concepts and other initiatives developed by the Armed Forces of the United States. These institutions have extensive capabilities for simulations, wargames, seminars, symposia, experimentation, and other thoughtful civil-military collaborative efforts for concept and force developments.

d. Military interaction with civilian institutions can also play an important role in preparing the Armed Forces for the future by maintaining links to the civilian sector, as well as helping academicians better understand and appreciate the role of the military instrument

in modern society. American educational institutions are primary sources of cultural assimilation, intellectual innovation, and societal progress. Schools and colleges are also the instruments that shape many of the attitudes and much of the personal capability of the men and women who constitute the Armed Forces of the United States. American educational and research institutions have a vital and irreplaceable role in shaping the future military capability of the United States.

3. Transforming the Force

a. Transforming the Armed Forces of the United States for future action across the range of military operations has evolutionary and revolutionary dimensions. Organizations that maintain readiness for current operations and contingencies may be limited to transformation at an evolutionary rate of change. Organizations that can suspend current activities may be able to sustain a revolutionary high rate of change. An approach that permits American military power to maintain a required readiness level while accepting rapid change is one that differentiates between the organizations charged with responsibilities for the present and those responsible for innovating for the

future. Transforming the Armed Forces of the United States, then, requires a carefully designed mix of current readiness and experimentation for the future, of stability and innovation. Organizations responsible for instantaneous response to unforeseeable threats cannot be experimental laboratories. Experimental laboratories cannot be expected to support ongoing military requirements of the combatant commands or the Services. **Plans and programs for transformation must simultaneously enhance the current force, facilitate evolution of the projected next force, and creatively invent the force after next.**

b. The products of analysis, modeling, simulation, and joint experimentation support the development of recommendations for change by the Armed Forces of the United States in the areas of concepts and doctrine, organizational design, education, and training for individuals and units, leader development, materiel, personnel, and facilities. To harness technology most effectively in the development of future materiel, co-evolution is essential among all these areas. In other words, future force development calls for an integrated system in which a change in any area is reconciled with the others. Their interrelationships must be addressed simultaneously. Consequently, concepts for future joint operations must not focus on any one area to the exclusion of the others. Each of the areas contains the potential for significant enhancement of US military capabilities.

c. Shaping the future of joint American military power calls for the integration of efforts across five groups of institutions that can contribute to this outcome.

- The Services and USSOCOM that are primarily responsible for future force development, and the defense agencies that are tasked to provide combat support capabilities to US forces.

- The combatant commands and other joint organizations whose responsibility it is to ensure the interoperability and coherency of the Armed Forces of the United States across the range of military operations.
- Multinational partners.
- The nonmilitary agencies of government and the civilian community, each with unique roles in shaping and complementing military power.
- Industry.

In conjunction with the co-evolution of all force development areas, the integration of these five groups is essential to a successful transformation of the Armed Forces of the United States. Together, they provide sources of future concept and force development.

d. Addressing the future of American military power, above all, calls for aggressive pursuit of new ideas. Those individuals and institutions charged with shaping the future must be able to think freely, to exploit success along the way and to be free to fail as well. Joint concepts for future operations provide a basis for the development of future joint forces, and assist the Services in developing their future forces for joint, multinational, and interagency operations.

"We face challenges today not greatly different from ancient warfighters, but we have added some new wrinkles. As technology has improved, distances and time have shrunk. The tempo of warfighting has increased over the last several decades; and the range, accuracy, and kinds of weaponry have greatly improved. But some challenges will never change. Commanders at all levels need to understand the enemy, to know their own forces, to establish warfighting goals and objectives, and to lead men and manage battles while suffering the fog and friction of war."

Gen Charles L. Donnelly, Jr., USAF

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APPENDIX A

THE STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

1. General

The estimate process is central to formulating and updating military options, plans, and actions to meet the requirements of any situation. Commanders and staffs at all levels should use the estimate process. Though its central framework for organizing inquiry and decision is essentially the same for any level of command, specific detailed questions within each part of this framework will vary depending on the level and type of action or operation contemplated. This framework is presented below. Specific material appropriate to national-level strategic activities has been added to flesh out the basic framework for readers of this publication.

2. Mission

a. Mission Analysis

- Determine the NCA's intent for the Armed Forces of the United States. Analyze presidential and other relevant national-level statements, guidance, policies, and strategies, including long- and short-term objectives.
- Determine the President's intent for military and nonmilitary participants in the contemplated action. Include other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational).
- Identify the requirements for support between military and nonmilitary participants in meeting the presidential intent.
- Identify standing arrangements between military and nonmilitary participants that

could facilitate accomplishing the presidential intent.

- Determine specified and implied tasks, and the priority that should be assigned to the tasks.

b. Mission Statement

- Express in terms of who, what, when, where (task parameters), and why (purpose).
- Frame as a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved.

3. Situation and Courses of Action

a. Situation Analysis

• Strategic Context

- Domestic and international context: political and diplomatic long-term and short-term issues; international economic issues; international informational issues; international interests (reinforcing or conflicting with US interests, including positions of parties neutral to the conflict); international law, positions of international organizations; domestic influences, including media access, public information, competing demands for resources, and national will; domestic and international political, economic, legal, and moral constraints; and other competing or distracting domestic and international situations.
- Characteristics of the issue that affect the battlespace, including: perspectives

and interests of other participants and opponents; unique military characteristics; economics (organization, industrial base, and mobilization capacity); social conditions; and science and technology factors affecting the operational area.

- **Analysis of the Adversary.** Adversary situation, including capabilities and vulnerabilities (at the national level, the intelligence community may have, or be able to produce, a formal national intelligence estimate). Analysis should include the following:

- Broad military COAs affecting the issue that are currently being taken or could be available in the future.

- Political and military intentions and objectives (to extent known).

- Military national, strategic, and operational advantages and limitations.

- Possible domestic and international military and nonmilitary support.

- COGs (national, strategic, and operational).

- **Friendly Situation.** Should follow the same pattern used for the analysis of the enemy. At the national level, this will normally rely on supporting estimates (including other participants' situations) and the relevant military personnel, logistics, and command, control, communications, and computer estimates. Multinational and interagency operations require specific analysis of other partners' objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

- **Restrictions.** Those limitations to the use or threat of use of the military instrument of national power that are

imposed or necessary to support other participants and other military worldwide strategic requirements and associated diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts.

- **Assumptions.** Intrinsically important factors on which the conduct of the contemplated action is based. Their articulation will facilitate periodic review, validation, and modification, as lessons learned from operations become available.

- **Deductions.** Deductions from above analysis should yield estimates of the relative strength of the four instruments of national power with emphasis on the capabilities of the military instrument in concerted action with the other instruments, including potential adversarial or other capabilities that can detract from mission accomplishment.

b. **Courses of Action Analysis.** COA development is based on the above analysis and a creative determination of how the mission will be accomplished. Each COA must be adequate, feasible, acceptable, and contribute to the accomplishment of national objectives. State all practical COAs open to the Armed Forces of the United States that, if successful, will accomplish the mission. Generally, at the national level, each COA will constitute a strategic concept and should outline the following:

- Major national and strategic tasks to be accomplished and the order in which they are to be accomplished.

- Forces and other resources required.

- Support concept including military logistic considerations.

- Force deployment concept, if required.

- Estimate of time required to achieve presidential intent expressed as political and military objectives.
- Concept for maintaining reserves, if applicable.
- Consequences for other high priority ongoing military activities.

4. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action

a. Determine the probable effect of possible adversary COAs on the success of each friendly COA.

b. Conduct this analysis in an orderly manner: by nonmilitary participant, time phasing, and functional event. Consider the potential actions of subordinates two echelons down.

c. Consider end state desired and termination issues; think through own action, adversary reaction, and friendly counteraction.

d. Conclude with revalidation of suitability, adequacy, and feasibility; determine additional requirements, if any; make required modifications; list advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

5. Comparison of Own Courses of Action

a. Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

b. Compare with respect to governing factors.

- Fixed values for military activities (national policy and strategy, domestic and international law, the principles of war, and the fundamentals of joint warfare).

- Other critical factors (for example, moral and practical constraints).

- Mission accomplishment.

c. If appropriate, merge elements of different COAs into one.

6. Decision

Translate the selected COA into a concise statement of what the Armed Forces of the United States, as a whole, are to do and explain, as may be appropriate, the following elements: who, when, where, how, and why.

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APPENDIX B

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine.

1. Objective

a. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

b. The objective of combat operations is the defeat of the enemy's armed forces' capabilities or the enemy's will to fight. The objective of an operation other than war might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective.

2. Offensive

a. The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

b. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war.

c. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or regain the initiative. An offensive spirit must therefore be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

3. Mass

a. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results.

b. To achieve mass is to synchronize and integrate appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass must often be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing the effects of combat power, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

4. Economy of Force

a. The purpose of economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

b. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

5. Maneuver

a. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

b. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver — or threaten delivery of — the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force.

Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

6. Unity of Command

a. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

b. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort — coordination through cooperation and common interests — is an essential complement to unity of command.

7. Security

a. The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.

b. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Risk is

inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.

8. Surprise

a. The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared.

b. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decision making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; operations security (OPSEC); and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

9. Simplicity

a. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

b. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution by reducing the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in combined operations.

APPENDIX C

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

The principles of war, while principally associated with combat operations, apply as well to MOOTW. Given the range of situations covered by MOOTW, the principles of war require special interpretation. When applied to MOOTW situations, the principles of war and other relevant factors form the basis for the principles of MOOTW. These are: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.

1. Objective

- a. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
- b. Understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort.
- c. Define specific measures of mission success.
- d. Translate political guidance into appropriate military objectives.
- e. Maintain flexibility to adapt to changes in political objectives.

2. Unity of Effort

- a. Seek unity of effort in every operation.
- b. Ensure that all means dedicated to the MOOTW are directed to a common purpose.
- c. Define command arrangements for military and nonmilitary participants.

3. Security

- a. Prevent hostile factions from acquiring a military, political, or informational advantage.
- b. Focus on achieving and maintaining freedom of action.
- c. Maintain vigilance; all forces have an inherent right of self-defense.
- d. Maintain OPSEC.
- e. Make provision for protection of civilians and participating agencies and organizations.

4. Restraint

- a. Apply appropriate military capability prudently.
- b. Make judicious use of force, applying the principle of proportionality.
- c. Gain and maintain the initiative while adhering to the ROE; ensure periodic review of the ROE and recommend changes when appropriate.

5. Perseverance

- a. Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.
- b. Remain patient, resolute, and persistent in pursuit of US and multinational objectives.

c. Integrate military actions with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts.

c. Adhere to objectives, ensuring actions are appropriate to the situation, and exhibit fairness in dealing with competing factions.

6. Legitimacy

a. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable.

d. Attend to the perspectives of the citizenry in the area of operations, particularly their views of the legitimacy of their government and of the MOOTW.

b. Legitimacy is based on the legality, morality, and rightness of the actions undertaken.

APPENDIX D

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Directorate for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 1, 10 January 1995, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*.

4. Change Recommendations

- a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

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
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